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THE AMERICAN
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THREE PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

STATE OF THE QUESTION

(1) What do we mean by "God"? We do not pretend to be able to define His *Nature;* we are content to define His *Name.* Our inability, however, to define the named reality is of no moment; for the question we seek to solve here is not *what* God is, but *whether* He is. It suffices, therefore, to understand what people ordinarily mean when they use the name of God. As a matter of fact men understand this name to mean the First or Uncaused Cause of all finite processes and things; the First Cause of the order of Nature; the First Cause of the Moral order, etc.

(2) When we say that God exists, we are not ascribing existence to Him as if it were some quality which He possesses in common with the finite beings we call creatures; for there is no class-concept or generic idea whatever under which we can include both God and creatures. If God were in the same class as these finite realities, far from being the supreme explanation they require, He Himself would stand in the same need of explanation as they. Hence we are forced to leave God, as the Uncaused, the Underived, the Unconditioned, the Undefinable, the Incomprehensible, outside all the categories of finite reality, which He infinitely transcends.

(3) And, should it be objected that only the definable, the limited, and the conditioned are intelligible to us, and that unless we can encompass God within our finite frames of thought, we leave Him wholly incomprehensible—completely outside the pale of human understanding, our reply is that His incomprehensibility does not detract one whit from His value as a solution of the problem before us. That we admittedly fail to make God understandable is entirely beside the mark; for in postulating the Incomprehensible, it is not *God* we are seeking to render intelligible, but *ourselves* and the *world.* It is to make ourselves and our finite universe understandable that we postulate what transcends our understanding, seeing that whatever is definable and comprehensible is destitute of self-sufficiency. The problem, therefore, of the Divine *Nature* remains legitimately insoluble. To understand that intelligible things are explicable only in the light of what is—for us—unintelligible, to comprehend the need of the Incomprehensible, to know that there *is* an Unknowable, that is the highest wisdom to which man's unaided reason can aspire.

(4) Hence to say that *God exists* resolves itself into affirming the *real existence of caused beings* whose dependent reality implies the independent reality of an *uncaused being.*

(5) To prove the existence of God, we cannot start out from the *idea* of God; our point of departure must be the *real* order of things. We form our ideas from perceptible things, but God is imperceptible. Hence we can have no intuitive idea of God, but must arrive at a knowledge of Him indirectly, inferring His reality from the actual existence of His visible effects, namely, the realities of the material world, these being ultimately incapable of existing apart from a Self-existent Reality. In other words, all our proofs for the existence of God must proceed *a posteriori* from effects to cause; each of them must start from the concrete facts of experience of whose existence our senses assure us.

(6) In all three, therefore, of the proofs to follow, it is simply a question of tracing the caused realities, with which our senses acquaint us (viz., the stars, minerals, plants, animals, men), back to a *primordial ground* upon which they ultimately depend, and of thereby accounting for them from the *most general* of all possible points of view.

Here we shall only attempt to sketch in bare outline the three main proofs for God's existence, namely:

I. The proof from Causality—the Metaphysical proof.
II. The proof from the Order of Nature—the Physical proof.
III. The proof from the Moral Order—the Moral proof.

I. PROOF FROM CAUSALITY

In this proof we demonstrate God's existence by applying a self-evident principle to a fact of observation. The principle we use is that of *efficient causality:* namely, "What comes into existence must have an adequate cause outside itself." We use the characteristic of *beginning in time*—of starting to be—as a mark or test by which we may distinguish the *caused* from the *uncaused:* as a sign or symptom that something is an *effect.* If anything comes into existence or ceases to exist, this is an indication that its existence is *unnecessary*, that is, not necessitated by an inner ground—its own nature. In other words, it shows that existence is *not essential* to such a being, but purely *accidental.* Beings that begin or end in time are beings that might just as well not be. Their nature admits quite as readily of non-existence as of existence, and all such beings we call contingent—meaning by contingency indifference to existence or non-existence. Contingent things do not owe their existence to themselves, but to factors outside themselves; if they actually exist, their existence is not grounded in themselves but in something outside themselves. Hence all *temporary* things are contingent beings which of their very nature require an *efficient cause* outside themselves. Their own nature is not a sufficient ground for what is given in experience, namely, their actual existence. As they are not *self-explanatory*, the fact of their existence must find its explanation in some ground external to themselves, and such an external ground we call an *efficient cause*. In short, *temporary* things are *contingent* (unnecessary), and contingent things are *produced* things, implying a causal ground outside themselves.

Logically, therefore, all things that begin to exist are so many *implicants* demanding as *implicate* an explanatory ground or cause outside themselves. But what further condition is required in order that the causal implication may be more than a mere logical necessity of thought, to wit, a *real* necessity of fact? Evidently, that further condition consists in the implicant, namely, the effect, being *given* in the *real order* of things (as opposed to being given merely in *thought*) with reference to the *implicate*, namely, the cause. Given, therefore, the *actual existence* of a *dependent* being in the real order of things, its dependence becomes *real*, implying the real existence of the cause on whose action its own existence is contingent.

Now, in Nature, i.e., in the real order of things, we do as a fact find many such impermanent, contingent, dependent realities that are not self-explanatory. For, as Aristotle says, "everything that is engendered by nature is capable at once of being and of not being."[1] Our senses testify to the existence of nebulae, stars and planets; minerals, animals and plants, all of which both come to be and cease to be. Therefore, we know with *certainty* of the *real* existence of countless things that fail to explain themselves and so imply an ultimate explanation in the equally certain reality of some self-existent Cause. When A speaks, B begins to hear. In such a case, B's hearing is the absolutely necessary consequence of A's speaking. In other words, A's speaking is necessarily implied in B's hearing. That implication is rooted in the physical reality of B's hearing and it makes certain the fact of A's speaking by completely excluding the possibility of B's hearing independently of A's speaking. Hence the inference of a real cause from the real existence of its effect conveys *certainty* by completely excluding the possibility of a proportionate cause not existing.

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[1] *Metaphysics*, VII, 7 (1032a 20).

The same holds true of a chain of interacting causes, whether arranged in a simultaneous spatial series or in a successive temporal one. As an example of a spatial series of subordinate causes synchronized in time, take the series of interdependent girders supporting a steel bridge—or take existing terrestrial plants and animals that are dependent for their respiration on the earth's atmosphere, which the earth holds in virtue of the gravitational pull developed by its mass; it is gravitation, too, that tethers the earth to the sun, enabling it to derive from this star the right amount of radiant energy required to maintain the flux of physical, chemical and biological change in operation on its surface. As an example of a series of interdependent causes acting in an order of succession, take the egg-and-chicken series, or any of the racial and embryological histories of the various plants and animals on earth.[2] In a causal chain of either type, the terminal effect which falls under our observation is seen to be dependent on certain immediate causes and conditions, and these in turn upon a whole series of intermediate factors, showing one and all—so far as observation extended by induction can trace them—a *common condition of dependence* upon ulterior causes and conditions. Now, since no dependent cause can act except under the influence of the ulterior factors by which its own action is conditioned, we are forced to postulate an ultimate *independent* and *self-sufficient ground* or *cause*, from which the entire series or chain of dependent causes is suspended. Given, therefore, that the terminal effect is an actual fact certified by our senses, then that *First*, *Unconditioned and Uncaused Cause*, together with all the intermediate conditions and causal factors intervening between the *First Cause* and the terminal effect, are virtually given along with said fact and invested with the *selfsame certainty* as the observed fact in which the series terminates. What holds true of the effect, therefore, also holds true of all the intermediate or second causes; for these subordinate, dependent agencies, whether they operate simultaneously or in succession, act only in so far as they are acted upon from without. Hence they, too, are contingent realities that do not contain within themselves the sufficient explanation of their own existence and operation.

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[2] The distinction between *successive* (metachronic) and *simultaneous* (synchronic) chains of causes becomes clearer if we recall that other distinction between the causes of a thing's *becoming* (*causae fiendi*) and the causes of its *being* (*causae essendi*). Some agents are the cause of their effect's *coming into existence*, but not directly of its *continuing in existence*. Thus two persons may be dependent on a third—the one who introduces them—for *becoming* friends, but, once formed, their friendship is henceforth independent of that third person for its *continuation*. Similarly, a child depends on the generative act of its parents for *coming to be*, but not for *continuing to be*, since said child may survive the death of its parents. Other agents, however, are the cause not merely of the *production* of their effect, but also of its *conservation*, in such wise that, should they cease to exist, the effect, too, will cease to exist. "Remove," says Sertillanges, "the chemical activity from the air that the animal breathes, or from the food that it assimilates, and it perishes at once. This animal existence is of such a nature that, while at first sight it seems to be independent, it is, on the contrary, at every moment of its existence, actually dependent upon a vast number of influences." (*Les Sources de la Croyance en Dieu*, p. 70.) It is the latter type of agents that form the links of the *spatial* causal series, whereas it is the causes of *becoming* that are ranged in the *temporal* causal series.

Consequently this first proof of God's existence resolves itself into the simple matter of tracing the whole generality of contingent realities, whose existence is certified by sense experience, to a *self-existent Source* upon which these derivative realities ultimately depend for their existence and activity, and of thereby fully accounting for them from the most general of all standpoints.

As to the dodge of "endless regress" as a means of evading the force of this argument, we are not at all interested in how far back the evolutionist is minded to prolong the chains of causation; let him string them out to infinity if he will. Of course, in a *spatial* series of actually operative causes, there cannot be endless conditioning of one cause by another. Such a causal series must have a starting-point; otherwise, it is indefinitely prolonged, and indefinite prolongation of the series of presupposed conditions is incompatible with the actuality of the present effect. All the conditions on which this effect directly depends must be fully realized, or the effect itself could not exist. As a matter of fact, the effect does exist and the fulfilment of all the presupposed conditions in the series is given in the factual existence of the terminal effect that we here and now perceive with our senses. In short, the whole series of intermediate conditions on which an actual fact here and now depends, must be *finite* and *fulfilled*. Hence, unless the simultaneous chain of interdependent causes terminates in an uncaused cause, it reposes upon a void of unfulfilment, irreconcilable with the perceived existence of its final effect as an *accomplished fact* and datum of *actual experience*.

The same, however, does not hold true of the *temporal* series. So, if the evolutionist prefers to assume an endless succession of interdependent causes, we need not deny the possibility thereof. It suffices to point out that his assumption affords no solution whatever of the problem at issue. Let him, if he so desires, increase to infinity the manifold of factors succeeding one another; so long as he fails to come to a *self-explanatory reality*, he is only *adding zeros in the way of explanation*, and though one adds zeros endlessly, he will never get a *positive total*—a thing that does not explain itself plus a thing that does not explain itself plus a thing that does not explain itself and so on forever, totals zero in the way of explanation. Being palpable *facts of observation*, however, these non-self-explanatory things simply *must* have a sufficient explanation *somewhere*, and as no such explanation can be found in the whole gamut of *caused* realities, we must look for it outside the entire class of such things. In other words, we can find it only in an *Uncaused Reality*—in a *Self-explanatory Being*.

In fact, increasing to infinity the multitude of beings that fail to explain themselves, far from solving the difficulty, only increases it. Thus adding to the number of inert bodies unable to move themselves (e.g., freight-cars) only increases the need of a motive power great enough to move them and certainly does not help one whit to supply that power. A million blind men have greater need of sight than one. A million beggars require more alms for their relief than a small number. In all such cases, adding to the number aggravates the problem rather than answers it. Similarly, increasing to infinity the multitude of things that fail to explain themselves simply increases the need of explanation. It is only by referring their existence to its Primordial Ground in a Self-explanatory and Underived Reality that we supplement the essential deficiency of dependent things and render their derived existence intelligible to ourselves.

Nature's universal indigence and dependence are manifest alike in living organisms and in inert minerals. Consider the essentially derivative character of plant and animal cells. One and all, living cells refer us back to long lineages of ancestral cells for an explanation of their present existence; one and all they refer us to earlier cells whence they have originated by an uninterrupted succession of mitotic divisions. All plants and animals consist at one time or another of a single cell, and cells originate in no other way than by cell-division, of one parent cell into two daughter cells. Hence the living organism in all its forms is fundamentally *derivative;* essentially *dependent*, too, on environmental factors operating upon it from without.

Turning from the cellular units of organic life to those of inorganic nature, we find the atom and the molecule manifesting an even greater dependence upon external factors. For both are *inert* units, not in the sense that they are destitute of all power, but in the sense that they have their native physico-chemical forces all turned, as it were, in an *outward* direction. Hence, unlike the living unit or cell, they are incapable of *self-regulation*, being wholly dependent on the intervention of *exterior* forces for all their changes and movements—for all utilization of their own energy-contents. Apart from the case of external intervention, they are incapable of exercising even the natural powers with which they are endowed. Material particles act only when set in motion and their motion is always an *effect.* To escape the inevitable conclusion, that *matter* cannot be a *First Cause,* materialists like Holbach and Büchner assume motion to be a natural property of matter and suppose atoms to be by nature in a state of perpetual motion. But this is absurd; for, as Newton pointed out, not *motion,* but *mobility,* is a natural property of matter. Furthermore, Baron Holbach's dogma that motion is an inherent property of matter not only contradicts experience, but is absolutely unthinkable. For, supposing a material particle to be in motion by its own nature, it follows that it will tend to move indifferently in all directions at once and will therefore remain rooted to the spot. Only therefore, on the supposition that some external force intervenes to determine the direction of its motion, will said particle be able to move in one direction rather than another. Hence no material particle can be self-moving; its motion is necessarily an *effect.*

Mineral matter, then, is essentially subject to the law of inertia, and its inertia, i.e., its *indifference* to *action* or *inaction,* gives evidence of its essential *contingence,* i.e., its *indifference* to *existence* or *non-existence.* Therefore no particle or particles of matter could possibly function in the role of the necessary being that is *First Cause* of the universe.

Furthermore, the molecule and the atom are subject to the law of the *degradation of energy.* Wherever atoms are built up into complex molecules, this constructive process is dependent upon a supply of energy, which must fall from a *higher level* of intensity at the *source* to a *lower level* of intensity at the *escape.* This is that Second Law of Thermodynamics, which tends to equalize all energy-levels everywhere and so bring about the "heat-death" of the Universe. Thus, when the energy stored up in a complex molecule is afterwards liberated by combustion, the potential thereof is degraded to a comparatively low level. Such an inorganic unit cannot operate otherwise than by externalizing and dissipating irreparably its own energy-content. Nor is its reconstruction and replenishment with the original potential ever again possible save at the expense of a still more richly endowed unit. What is true of the molecule is true of the atom; for all the phenomena of radioactivity tell the same tale. Atoms are constantly disintegrating—at any rate, this is true of the heavier or so-called radioactive atoms, which spontaneously disintegrate. Even the lighter atoms, however, can be smashed. And, one and all, they are impotent to re-integrate themselves once they have broken down into electrons, protons, neutrons, positrons, etc. Then "not all the King's horses nor all the King's men can ever put Humpty-Dumpty together again." In this irreparable process of disintegration, the orbital electrons develop free radiant energy as they fall from superficial positions of unstable equilibrium to positions of stable equilibrium nearer the atomic nucleus. In this way, the atom converts its potential into radiation and so dissipates its store of energy. The inorganic world knows no constructive process whereby this downward trend of potential can be arrested, and the whole universe, like a gigantic storage-battery, points backward to a time when it was "charged" and forward to the night of universal inactivity and death, which the dissipation of energy, that is, the equalization of all its gradients, inevitably portends.

Though the living organism does enjoy a certain measure of *constructive* power—"a tendency to disturb equilibria, to reverse the dissipative processes which prevail throughout the inanimate world, to store up and build where they are ever scattering and pulling down" (Ward), still this constructive power of living matter is confined within very narrow limits. It can only rise to a determinate level, from which it periodically wanes with the various phases of the life-cycle, wherein life having been relayed by reproduction comes to maturity and then terminates in death. Hence the need of periodic processes of renewal—of rejuvenescence by endomixis, or amphimixis—to step up the ebbing tide of vitality. Moreover, as has been intimated, the constructive power of living cells does not cancel their dependence on exterior factors; they must ever depend not only upon germinal factors transmitted from generation to generation (for their hereditary types), but also upon environmental factors (for their supply of assimilatable matter and energy). Only, too, while the heat-energy furnished by the sun remains at a comparatively high level of intensity can the living organism survive and continue to exercise its all too limited constructive powers.

Thus all the units of the organic and inorganic worlds alike exhibit a condition of essential dependence—a lack of self-sufficiency. Inasmuch, therefore, as these organisms and minerals are real components of our universe, whose actual existence is attested by our senses, their visible presence in Nature implies the real, if invisible, presence of the indispensable complement of their dependency and insufficiency—a *First* or *Uncaused Cause.* In other words, the existence of a Self-existent Being is a necessary implication of this universal cosmic need.

We are now in position to appreciate the force of the argument from causality:

Major: The existence of things that begin and cease to be is *caused,* i.e., grounded not within but without in what must ultimately be the self-grounded existence of an *Uncaused Cause;*

Minor: But all the realities of the visible world are temporary beings, i.e., things that begin and cease to be:

Consequent: Therefore this whole universe of temporary things (whose actual existence our senses attest) is caused, i.e., grounded in a *Self-existent Reality* whose existence is just as certain as is the existence of the aforesaid temporary things.

Or, briefly:

Contingent beings exist not by reason of themselves but by reason of something else; now, the existence of contingent beings is a fact of observation: therefore, there exists something else than contingent beings: namely, a *Necessary Being,* whose existence is just as certain as is the existence of contingent beings.

II. PROOF FROM THE ORDER OF NATURE

Order is an apt arrangement of various things for a purpose—an adaptation of many means to one end—e.g., books in a library; parts in a machine; cells, tissues and organs in an animal. The *matter* of order is the manifold of elements, parts, or means. The *form* of order is finality, that is, direction to one end.

We distinguish two kinds of *finality,* namely: internal and external. When means and ends are united in a single substance, we have a case of *internal* finality; an example of such finality is to be found in the animal, in which the organs as means are one substance with the whole organism which is their end. When, however, means and end are distinct substances, e.g., the parts of a machine, that is, when they form not a single *substance,* but only a single *system,* we have a case of *external* finality. Order itself is of two kinds, namely, structural and functional. Structural order consists in a differentiation of co-ordinate parts, e.g., the anatomical parts of an organism. Functional order consists in the subordination of many secondary operations to one main function, e.g., the co-operation of ennervation and of muscular contraction in the function of locomotion, and all other cases of physiological division of labor observable in organisms.

Is there any evidence of order and finality *in nature*, or is design and purposiveness a strictly *human* phenomenon? No one denies that human conduct is *intentional*, that man intends to reach ends or purposes by means of his actions. For man has a conscious intelligence and is therefore capable of acting with a conscious purpose in view. But are there "intentions" of nature analogous to the intentions of man? Man, for example, can conceive an aeroplane as something desirable and then proceed to design and construct it; but is it not anthropomorphic to regard irrational nature as pursuing ends? No, for we do not say that the agencies of nature pursue goals *consciously*, as man does. All we claim is that there are in nature certain *goalward trends* that resemble the purposeful or intentional actions of man. Irrational and even unconscious agents pursue definite goals, which they normally, if not always, reach. Thus an acorn grows up into an oak. That which is born departs from an original state and advances towards a final state or goal. Hence we see in irrational nature a certain goalfulness analogous to human purposefulness. The recognition of this analogy between man's purposeful conduct and nature's goalward processes is a simple recognition of fact. Each natural agency does in fact attain to results that are good and useful for it *just as if it recognized them as such* and consciously tended towards them. But to say that they act as if they intelligently apprehended the desirability of these ends or goals is not to ascribe conscious intelligence to said agents. It does not imply a consciousness or intelligence inherent in the natural things that act for an end any more than the rational sequence of words spoken by a phonograph implies a conscious intelligence inherent in the hard rubber disc. A savage, of course, might make the mistake of *anthropomorphizing* the phonograph—of thinking that there must be a man inside. He would then be wrong in ascribing the rational discourse to an intelligence inherent in the machine, but he would not be wrong in his general inference that the speech implied an intelligent cause; for it really does imply a *directive intelligence outside* the device.

It is, therefore, an undeniable fact that the irrational and even the unconscious things of nature do normally tend towards results that further their development and perfection just as if they were aware the usefulness of said results and sought them on purpose. That is why the productions of nature are comparable to those of art—Father Nieuwland's synthesis of artificial rubber to the production of latex by a rubber plant. Take, for instance, the unconscious embryological process by which the fertilized egg develops into a fish. Here the parallelism with the work of a human artist is so striking that the great cytologist Edmund Wilson is impelled to exclaim: "It is an impressive spectacle that is offered by the egg when busily engaged at its work of blocking out the embryo without visible tools or model, but with an uncanny air of deliberate purpose and mastery of technique that any human artist might envy."[3] "There is more of finality and beauty in the works of nature," exclaims Aristotle, "than in those of art."[4]

In both Nature and Art we see serial or gradated processes at work, in which each succeeding step is *in view of* the next; in which the stage that precedes prepares the way for the stage that follows. Human art does but *imitate* nature (e.g., Father Nieuwland's synthesis of rubber) or *supplement* nature (e.g., medical art curing disease by means of artificial fever). This is necessarily so; for art presupposes science and science is a knowledge of nature gained through the senses. Art cannot produce until it has gotten a scientific understanding of the natural process, and natural processes are only understandable in the light of their goals. We do not understand a part of a machine or an organ of an animal until we know the *purpose* it serves, that is to say, its *function*. Hence, if nature were not orderly, imitative art, which is grounded on a knowledge of nature, would not be methodic, which is the same as saying that it would be impossible.

Nature is purposeful with both external and internal finality, and is consequently orderly with both structural (aesthetic) and functional (dynamic) order. First of all, there is external finality in the universe. For the things of the world are useful to one another, i.e., they are so constituted, differentiated and adjusted with reference to one another as to seem deliberately chosen to suit one another. Consider the precision of celestial movements that astronomy reveals and the nice balance between centrifugal force and centripetal gravitation in the solar system. Consider the suitable mixture of gases in the earth's atmosphere; the unique properties of such compounds as water and carbon dioxide, constituents of the environment so suited to organic life that Lawrence J. Henderson, the biochemist of Harvard, is led to conclude: "the biologist may now rightly regard the universe in its very essence as biocentric."[5] In like manner, the plant world is adapted to the animal world and *vice versa.* Thus the reduction of carbon dioxide by green plants is complementary to the respiration of oxygen by animals, as is seen in the so-called "balanced aquarium." The entomophilous plants nourish the insects with the nectar of their flowers, while the latter in return, by transporting the pollen from flower to flower, ensure by way of fertilization the reproduction of the plants. Green plants draw their nutriment from the mineral world and their energy from the sun, and so build up reserves of proteins, carbohydrates and oils which supply the herbivorous animals (unable to tap the resources of the inorganic world) with food and energy. The carnivorous animals by preying on the herbivores protect the plant world from the ravages that would result from an excessive multiplication of the herbivores. The marine animals utilize the minerals dissolved in sea-water to construct their calcareous shells and thereby prepare the rocks of the future. The lichens conquer these rocks and begin their conversion into a soil that is utilizable by the higher plants. Everywhere, in short, we see evidences of a mutual coordination between the components of the universe and of a general harmony that arises out of this reciprocal action. The parts of the world are linked together to form, not indeed one single substance, but one orderly *system*, in which each component by pursuing its own development and perfection contributes at the same time to the common good of the universe of things.

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[3] *Science*, March 29, 1923, p. 284.

[4] *Parts of Animals*, I, 1 (639b 19–20).

However, all this external finality of Nature is based upon *internal* finality; it is subordinate to, and consequent upon, a deeper immanent finality. Each reality of the world moves by a natural tendency or law of its being towards an intrinsic goal—towards the realization of a *good* that perfects itself. But while thus tending towards the realization of its own proper perfection, it simultaneously realizes an *external* finality consisting in the order and harmony of the whole cosmic system.

Inasmuch as the units of the inorganic world—the molecule and the atom—are submicroscopic in their dimensions, it is difficult to get clear evidence of the existence of internal finality in the mineral kingdom. The units of the plant and animal worlds—namely, the one-celled and especially the many-celled organism—are larger; and here we experience no difficulty in finding clear instances of internal finality. Consider, for example, the hierarchic order of cells, tissues, organs, systems and the subordination of secondary functions to the main function, which we find in the higher animals. In a machine there is nothing but external finality; the various parts are so many distinct substances that serve man's purpose, not their own—not a purpose intrinsic to the parts or to the whole. In the organism, however, all the parts coalesce to form a single substantial whole, and all their functions subserve the good of that whole. Organisms, therefore, have an intrinsic principle of finality (a nature) constantly directing their activities to an inward goal—the development and preservation of the organism as a whole. The cells exist and function for the sake of the tissues, these for the sake of the organs, these for the sake of the systems, these for the sake of the organism as a whole. Consider the wonderful adaptation of parts in the human eye—choroid, retina, corpus vitreum, lens, iris, ciliary muscle, etc.—all of which, from the microscopic rods and cones of the retina to the transparent corpus vitreum, discharge partial functions tributary to the main function of sight, in marvellous conformity with optical laws and the wave-lengths of visible light. Or consider the adaptation of a fish's gills to the function of breathing under water. Says the cytologist Edmund Wilson: "Animals that live in water are provided with gills. Were this all, we could probably muddle along with the notion that gills are no more than lucky accidents. But we encounter a sticking point in the fact that gills are so often accompanied by a variety of ingenious devices, such as reservoirs, tubes, valves, pumps, strainers, scrubbing brushes, and the like, that are obviously tributary to the main function of breathing. Given water, asks the naturalist, how has all this come into existence and been perfected?"[6]

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[5] *Fitness of the Environment* (New York, 1913), p. 312.

The adaptation of an organ to its function is an example of *dynamic* order. Besides this functional order, there is another kind of order, namely, the *aesthetic* order of symmetry; for the variety and unity which results from the symmetrical distribution of structural parts is what we mean by *beauty of form.* The world of living organisms exhibits four general types of symmetry (radial, branched, serial and bilateral) while the inorganic world is characterized by its six great systems of crystalline symmetry (regular, hexagonal, quadratic, rhombic, monoclinic and triclinic).

Superimposed upon this beauty of form is the *beauty of color,* the harmony of the color-scheme, which is so exquisite in Nature as to be the despair of the human artists striving to reproduce it. Says C. J. Shebbeare: "To produce a good colour scheme is not easy, as everyone knows who has tried it. Yet Nature surmounts this difficulty daily. The colour schemes of nature are not all of equal beauty. But even the worst are good, and stand in strong contrast, as objects of study and imitation, with some of the products of human manufacture and art. Each year the Royal Academy, in spite of the exercise of much selective skill, exhibits many schemes of colour, which are worse than any which a critical observer can find in Nature in a life-time."[7]

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[6] *Smithson. Inst. Rpt.* for 1915, p. 405.

Well may the human artist take the flowers and the tropical birds and fishes as his models in composing color-schemes. But it is not from the beauties of color and form in isolation from each other that the beauty of nature arises, but rather from their interplay. Says Joyce: "Nor is it colour alone that is in question. . . . The outlines of the different kinds of trees, the configuration of their leaves, the varied curves of their branches are as perfect in their way as is the colouring of the flowers. . . . We recognize beauty as the authentic note of nature in all its works."[8]

The *instincts* of animals offer striking evidence of the existence of *finality* in nature. "Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance" (William James). To pass over the wonderful instincts of the insect world, we shall cite but two instances taken from the mammals. The dog infested with the parasitic genus of tapeworm known as *taenia* displays a seeming knowledge of pharmaceutics, in that it will greedily devour Common Wormwood (*Artemisia absynthium*), an herb which it never otherwise touches. The beaver, too, acts as though it knew something of the science of engineering and hydromechanics. But who has taught it that its hut would be exposed to the danger of destruction by floods unless it protects the latter by building a dam—a dam erected with such efficiency as to defy the skill of the expert engineer? We mention this instance, because the beaver's instinct to erect dams not only advances its own interest, but is of advantage to the other animals, which share its environment, and even to the surrounding vegetation. For this reason, the United States government now uses beavers to further its program of water-conservation and the reclamation of land lost through soil-erosion. These busy little animals can save the situation where man is powerless to do so.

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[7] *The Challenge of the Universe*, 1918, p. 111.

[8] *Principles of Natural Theology* (London, 1923), p. 128.

Brute animals, it is true, have sense-consciousness. But, lacking rational intelligence, they have no consciousness of the ends they pursue in their instinctive behavior. How could they, since the goal to which their present conduct leads is not yet realized and is therefore imperceptible to the senses? Neither does that goal pre-exist in their memory, because they perform their instinctive acts without any previous practice or experience. Hence they, too, like the agents of unconscious nature, are borne onward to goals of which they are unaware, by virtue of an innate tendency or natural trend. They act, therefore, *towards* ends, but not *on account* of ends (as man does).

We are now ready to consider the proof of God's existence from the order of Nature:

Major: The apt arrangement of means for an end implies an intelligent cause;

Minor: But Nature affords countless instances of means aptly arranged for ends in the case of *unintelligent* and even *unconscious* agents:

Consequent: Therefore there is a *Directive Intelligence* that steers the irrational and the unconscious agents of Nature to their respective goals by means of laws inscribed in their very natures.

As to the Major: The adaptation of present means to an as yet unrealized goal is an invisible relation that cannot be sensed but only understood. Hence the adaptation of present means to a future end is something for which the sense-consciousness of an irrational animal can never account. It becomes still more unaccountable (upon internal grounds) when the agent that adapts means to end is altogether unconscious, as happens, *e.g.*, when a seed takes steps to become an adult plant. We understand how man's conduct can be purposeful, because he has an *inherent* intelligence in which the goal he seeks can pre-exist as an *ideal* and so influence the course of action by which he will eventually bring about its *realization.* But this is not the case when an acorn grows towards its goal, which is the oak. This as yet *unrealized* tree does not exist, cannot be seen, cannot exert any efficient influence on the process of growth. Nevertheless, the physical causes active in the acorn are evidently guided goalward throughout the entire process of growth, and such guidance or direction presupposes a *Directive Intelligence.*

The unrealized end or purpose, we repeat, does not exist in the *real* order. Hence it can only influence the goalward process on condition that it exists in the *ideal* order, i.e., as a design or plan in some guiding intelligence. Thus if the house *to be built* actually does influence the sawing of the lumber, the pouring of the concrete, the laying of bricks, etc., that can only be on the supposition that the house exists somewhere, namely, in the mind of the architect; for an absolute non-entity—without any existence real or mental—could exert no influence on physical causes.

On the other hand, the guiding intelligence need not be *inherent* in the goalward-tending agent itself. The apt articulation of vowels and consonants into syllables, of syllables into words and of words into sentences for the purpose of conveying rational thought is in fact accomplished by an unintelligent and unconscious phonograph. Of course, the rational discourse delivered by the phonograph does presuppose a directive intelligence. But that intelligence is not a conscious intelligence *inherent* in the hard rubber disc; it is a *directing intelligence outside the mechanism*, namely, the intelligence of the man who gave the recording. When, therefore, unconscious and irrational agents of Nature show an adaptation of means to end, when they are steered to goals in the course of natural processes, we know that their goalward trends, being inexplicable by any intelligence intrinsic to said agents, call for explanation in a *Directive Intelligence* external to these natural agents, and this Directive Intelligence, which ordains the cosmic order and steers irrational things to their respective ends, is the *Supreme Intelligence* that men call GOD.

III. PROOF FROM THE MORAL ORDER

The moral argument for the existence of God is not a rigid demonstration like the foregoing metaphysical and physical proofs. It proves the fitness rather than the fact of God's existence—viz., that God is a postulate of the moral order and that there could be no moral order without the existence of the Author of Nature, whose reality we have just established. This moral argument for the existence of God comprises four main points, which we shall endeavor to set forth as briefly as possible.

(1) First, there is the patent fact of *moral disorder* prevalent in this world, a disorder that can only be *rectified* if there be a future life of retribution in which God, as an infinitely just Judge, will adequately reward virtue and adequately punish vice. In the present life, the virtuous often suffer while the wicked enjoy an undeserved prosperity.

It was the sight of this moral disorder in the world that caused the Psalmist to exclaim: "My steps had well nigh slipped. For I was envious at the arrogant, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked. For there are no pangs at their death, and their body is sound. In the trouble of men they are not; neither are they scourged like other men. Therefore pride holds them fast; violence covereth them as a garment. Their eyes stand out with fatness; they have more than their heart could wish. They scoff, and in wickedness utter oppression; they speak as if there were none on high .... my people said: 'How doth God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?' Behold these are sinners; and yet abounding in the world they have obtained riches. Verily in vain have I cleansed my heart and washed my hands among the innocent .... I thought to understand this thing, it is wearisome in my sight; until I enter into Thy courts and understand concerning their last end" (Psalm 72 (73): 2–17). None of the sanctions of human justice provide an adequate reward for virtue or an adequate punishment for vice. These sanctions are especially the following: (1) *Juridical* sanction—the retribution meted out by courts of law; (2) *Social* sanction—the approval or disapproval of public opinion; (3) *Moral* sanction—the peace or remorse of one's own conscience.

But even when taken collectively, such sanctions fall short of being a sufficient reward for virtue or punishment for vice. Thus the conscience of hardened sinners is seared while the conscience of virtuous persons is tender. Hence it is the latter rather than the former who are troubled with scruples, qualms and remorse. As for the juridical sanction of law, human justice can take no account of man's internal acts, but only of his external behavior, and even in dealing with the latter it sometimes miscarries, punishing the guiltless and allowing the guilty to go scot-free. In fact, human law has been compared to a web that catches only the smaller flies; for the rich and powerful criminals generally break through its meshes.

As for social sanction, which consists in the praise or blame of public opinion, it is even more unsatisfactory. Not only does it fail to take account of anything beyond externals, but it is often based on mawkish sentiment, which is more apt to sympathize with the murderer than with his victim. Where, then, is the "Unknown Soldier," who having made the supreme sacrifice for his country lies forgotten and unhonored in some charnel trench, to receive a suitable reward for his bravery and unselfishness? Where is the innocent man, sent to the electric chair because of perjured testimony or because of the incompetence of the judge, to receive compensation for the injustice done to him? Where is the scoundrel who commits suicide, after running the gamut of pleasure with other men's money and other men's wives, to receive the punishment adequate to his deserts?

Even atheistic systems like Buddhist philosophy recognize the fact of moral disorder in this world, where the innocent suffer and the guilty often prosper. But Buddhists account for it by the "Law of Karma"—the innocent man, they assert, is being punished for the sins he committed *in a former existence;* the wicked man is being rewarded in the present life for the virtuous deeds of his previous existence, even as he will be punished for his present misdeeds in a *future existence.* Buddhists, however, fail to prove this gratuitous assertion; they complicate matters, too, by assuming not simply *one* future life, but a *whole series* of future lives; and, finally, it is the bad Buddhist who has ahead of him the prospect of an interminable succession of future lives, whereas the only reward in prospect for a good Buddhist is eventual extinction in Nirvana. The Buddhistic "Law of Karma," therefore, is far from being a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil.

(2) Secondly, there is the fact of the existence of an *unwritten moral law* promulgated by the *voice of Conscience.* This law is not of man's own making; for he is powerless to repeal it. Its imperative "must not" prevails over every other consideration, so much so that a man is bound to give up his very life rather than transgress it. If a soldier captured by the enemy be offered a choice between betraying his country or facing a firing-squad, he really has no choice at all; he must go to his death rather than sully his conscience by doing what this *eternal law* forbids; no physical evil is comparable to the moral evil involved in transgressing it. It is not, then, self-imposed law, but one that has to be obeyed regardless of one's personal interests or personal inclinations. Therefore it comes from on high, from the Supreme Law-giver and all-seeing Judge, whom we call God. The existence of such a Supreme Legislator and Judge of perfect justice is a *sine qua non condition* of the moral order.

(3) Thirdly, there is the so-called *Eudaemoniological* argument for God's existence as a postulate of the *perfect happiness without limit or termination,* for which human nature craves. Whereas brute animals find contentment in the enjoyment of a few material goods (the pleasures of food and sex), man's will is insatiable—literally limitless in its aspirations. No good that is limited or impermanent can possibly content it; for the object of the human will is unlimited happiness,

good in general, infinite good. Therefore, unless there really is an *Infinite and Eternal Good* capable of satisfying his vehement longing for perfect and boundless happiness, man is a most miserable creature, doomed to inevitable frustration and disappointment. For no finite or temporal goods can ever fill the aching void in his soul, or appease his insatiable craving. The *Boundless and Eternal Good*, adequate to fulfill their desire for perfect and unlimited happiness, is the *Infinite Being* that men call God.

(4) Everywhere and always mankind has been *religious*. All nations in all times have worshipped *Divinity.* From the rude stone altars of prehistoric men to the great marble "Altar of Heaven" erected by the Chinese people for offering sacrifice to the Supreme Ruler of the universe, countless religious monuments of every age testify to man's universal worship of God, beginning with times prior to the dawn of history. Even the corrupted theism of the polytheistic religions, which pluralize God, bears witness to this fact. The same holds true of modern, as well as ancient, times; for today, as of yore, religion is diffused over the whole world. Hence the men of all times and all places acknowledge their dependence on some superhuman Power that is worthy of their worship. There are, it is true, atheistic individuals, but there is *no atheistic tribe or nation*, and every language has a name for God.

Recent research shows that even the savage tribes are theistic—not only theistic, but *monotheistic;* for most of them worship supremely One whom they call the "*All-Father*." We find all of them venerating "an early Supreme Being, obscured later by ancestor-worship, but not often lost to religious tradition" (Andrew Lang). As for civilized man, his greatest architectural triumphs, from the Temple of Karnak to the Basilica of St. Peter's, are houses of *divine* worship. In this universal human chorus praising God we hear the voices of the greatest geniuses of antiquity and of today—a Socrates, a Plato and an Aristotle; a Pasteur, a Planck and a Millikan. This universal verdict of mankind cannot be dismissed as an illusion; for God is an invisible reality not subject to sense. Neither can men be said to be thinking with their feelings when they conclude that God exists; for recognition of God is something that puts restraint upon human passions, upon human pride and upon human egoism. Consequently, mankind's conviction as to the existence of God must be presumed to rest upon objective evidence.

We cannot enter here into the question of God's *unity* nor can we take up the problem of the Divine *Nature*. However, we are loath to leave the subject without adding a word of warning against anthropomorphic conceptions of God. Popular religion is prone to humanize God—to visualize Him as a magnified "gaseous man." Pantheism, too, degrades God to the level of the finite by identifying Him with His creation. Let us never forget that God is beyond all that we can think of Him and that we cannot encompass Him within the finite frames of human thought. Of God, according to the formula of Aquinas, greatest of theologians, *we only know what He is not and in what relation other things stand to Him.* And Aquinas goes on to remark that even the highest perfections of creatures may be quite as properly denied of God as affirmed of Him, that, in fact, in reference to God, their negation is more proper than their affirmation.

Hence, when we say that God is intelligent, we must hasten to deny that He is an intelligence like any of the intelligences of which we have experience. Of God, instead of saying that He is a *being*, a *person* and so forth, it would be more proper for us to say that He is not a *being*, but a *super-being;* not a *person*, but a *super-person;* not *good*, but transcendent to all goodness. The only reason we affirm rather than deny these finite conceptions of God is that our denial might be misunderstood to mean that God is *below* the highest perfections of creatures which such concepts represent, whereas we intend our denial to mean that God is *above* these perfections. Thus to deny that God is "personal" and to refer to Him as *it* instead of *He*, would be to degrade Him to the level of the impersonal, the unconscious and the lifeless. In a word, if we denied that God is "intelligent," our denial might be taken to mean that God is *inferior* to intelligent beings like men—His rational creatures—and this would leave unexplained the order and beauty of Nature. But we are quite willing to hear such conceptions denied of God provided the denial means that God is *above* and *not below* the highest perfections of His created *effects*—those finite products of His infinite power that we call creatures.

The existence of God, the Self-existent Being, is an implication of the universal cosmic need, and so it is in terms of this need that we come to know and speak of God. But when we thus "define" and qualify God in terms of this relation of dependence which His finite derivatives bear to Him, we do not thereby introduce Him into any of the categories of created being. For He does not share in the limitations or deficiencies of creatures, but differs from them in all that they are. If He partook of their insufficiency, He Himself would require explanation and He would no longer be the Self-explanatory Ground of the universe. Hence, as has been said, we are forced to leave God, as the Underived, the Unconditioned and the Undefinable, outside all of our human categories.

All the notions we apply to God signify at bottom nothing more than the indigence of the world and by implication, but negatively, too, the complementary sufficiency of that Transcendent Reality from which the whole world is suspended.

We live by Nature and we define and measure Nature in order to improve our mode of life. If, then, this failing world of ours, along with our fragile selves, is suspended from a Transcendent Being, it must needs be that "we live more by this Transcendent Being than we do by Nature" (Sertillanges).

Now, as Nature demands to be known by us as the price of her bounty, so Nature's God wishes to be *lived consciously* by us and to guide our lives by the light of the rational intelligence He has bestowed upon us. He in whom we are loved and cherished, "in whom we live and move and have our being," desires to become in us an object of thought and love, in order that the dependence of all the rest of creation upon Him may become in us a dependence of the conscious soul.

That is our exalted destiny and to attain it, we conceive God as best we may on the basis of our relations of dependence upon Him, and since these relations are very *real* on our part, what we think is *true* when we represent God in terms of that relation, although, so far as its power of *defining Him* is concerned, it must be regarded as inadequate under penalty of becoming null and void.

All that is true in the conceptions of *source*, *cause* and *being* as applied to God resolves itself into an implication of the universal indigence of the world and of ourselves considered from the most general point of view. We call Him Source and Cause in that we recognize that we and our universe are dependent realities. But it is upon ourselves that our statements about God ultimately recoil. What they qualify is not God as He is in Himself at all—it is God as He is *in relation to ourselves.* And since God's relation to creatures is unreal on His part and real only on theirs, to say that our statements qualify God in relation to ourselves is the same as saying that we speak about God in terms of *our relations to Him.*

To understand this, it should be noted that some relations are *bilaterally* real while others are only *unilaterally* so. Thus the relation of mother to child is a *mutual* or bilaterally real relation, in that this relation involves a *real ground* in *both* the *subject* and *term* of the relation—the process of active conception in the mother and the process of being conceived or passive conception in the child. The relation, however, of a reader to a book is only *unilaterally* real in that the process on which the relation is grounded occurs in *one extreme alone* of the relation and not in the other. For it is the reader alone that is changed by reading a book, passing as he does from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge. But the other extreme of this relation, namely, the book, is not affected by the process of reading; it remains unchanged. Hence the relation of reading has a real ground in the reader, but no real ground in the book that is read. It is *real* on the part of the *reader*, but *unreal* on the part of the *book*. Similarly, the relation of the *Creator* to *creatures* is only *unilaterally* real. It has a real ground in creatures, because as a result of creation creatures come into *real* existence. But, inasmuch as it involves *no real change in God*, it has no real ground in the Creator. Hence it is real on the part of creatures but unreal on the part of God.

It follows, therefore, that whenever we affirm anything of God, we are speaking of Him in terms of either our own relations to Him or of the relations of other creatures to Him. And since these relations have *real* and *essential* grounds in creatures, the statements we make on these grounds are *true*, though of course inadequate to define God as He is in Himself. And so we reach once more the formula of St. Thomas of Aquin: *Of God we know only what He is not and in what relation all else stands towards Him.* And this is also the burden of the passage in the *Confessions* (X, 6) of the Church's other great theologian, St. Augustine, who writes: "I asked the earth, and it said: 'I am not He,' and all that dwelt therein, and they acknowledged the same. I asked the sea and the deeps and the living creeping things thereof, and they answered: 'We are not He—seek thy God higher (*quaere super nos*).' I asked the blowing winds, and all the air and its inhabitants: 'Anaximenes was deceived,' they said, 'we are not thy God.' I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon and the stars: 'Nor are we,' said they, 'the God whom thou seekest.' And I said to all the things that encompass the doors of my flesh: 'Ye have told me of my God that ye are not He; tell me something of Him.' And they cried out with a loud voice: *Ipse fecit nos*—'He made us and we did not make ourselves'" (Psalm, 100:3).

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OLD TESTAMENT EVALUATIONS

In the past few months a solitary article of worth, on the Old Testament, has reached us from across the ocean; and in view of the fact that we hope to have in the not too distant future a very readable Catholic English translation of the Old Testament, we think it advisable not merely to call attention to it, but to consider its content at some length. The article, entitled "On Reading the Old Testament," appeared in the January, 1944 issue of *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* (pp. 39–47). It was written by the Reverend Daniel Duffy, D.D. The author is a theologian, and while noting the fruitfulness of the Old Testament as a source of piety, his chief concern is with its usefulness in the field of theology. Our purpose in reviewing the article will be to clarify from the exegetical viewpoint some of the ideas mentioned by the writer.

There is need of such clarification, not merely because we cannot always assent wholeheartedly to some of the impressions roused by Father Duffy's remarks, but also, and chiefly, because we feel that something should be done to prepare the laity for the fruitful reading of the text to be put into their hands. Sporadically appearing articles in newspapers, Sunday supplements, and popular magazines, have been spreading false and misleading notions about the historical and cultural background of the Hebrews; and because these notions are practically the only ones received, some effort should be made to provide a saner outlook before a more extensive reading takes place.

The Old Dispensation was a preparation for the New, and it embraced a period of at least two thousand years. The record of that preparation, as we have it in the books of the Old Testament, begins under the hand of Moses in the fifteenth century and continues under various hagiographers intermittently until the second century before the Christian era. We have, then, a continually fluctuating historical and cultural background, yet at the same time a changeless substratum of revealed truth. There are additions to an ever growing *depositum fidei* of the Old Law, changing customs and attitudes, but always the same fundamental moral code, the same unique God, the same Messias to come.

The Old Testament (like the New) is, as Father Duffy points out (p. 40), the Word of God, its truth guaranteed by divine authority. It is divinely inspired, and has God Himself as Author. It is this fact which for the Catholic makes the Scriptures absolutely unique among the histories and literatures of the world. There is one special aspect to this uniqueness which we might well ponder in these days of racial discriminations. From the very fact that God is the Author, we have portrayed for us not only externally visible events, but also the true motivations which lie behind the events; it is a divinely inspired evaluation of incidents and of characters from the normally unattainable reverse side. Over a brief span of years we have something similar in the New Testament; but nowhere else in the whole sweep of human chronicles from the beginning have we anything comparable; never are we taken behind the scene and shown accurately the motivations, aims, true results that lie hidden from the eye of the most acute observer.

If in any age, including our own, we were to receive the direct, detailed judgment of God on events of the day, and on the various characters who from time to time play their parts, how differently would history read! How much closer to the Hebrews we would find ourselves when our intentions, shams, hypocrisies were laid bare! If the sacred record at times presents an unpleasant, even a disgusting appearance, it is because for our instruction the veil of unreality has been torn aside, and we see the *truth* about men and events. If the veil were drawn aside in our own day we might be surprised to find that what we have condescendingly labeled as primitive has a very modern appearance indeed.

Besides its Divine Author, Scripture has also its human authors, hagiographers of varying eras, differing backgrounds. Under divine inspiration they have transmitted God's message in a human way, coloring it in accordance with the ideas of their times to a degree short of all error. They have as their purpose the religious instruction of their people in the ways of God and of man and nowhere do they lose consciousness of this primary aim. If in presenting their divinely received instructions they think in terms of accepted theories of their day which have not stood the test of scientific inquiry, nowhere do they assert the truth of these theories. For instance, if in narrating the creation of all things by God the sacred author betrays the presence in his mind—as many hold—of the erroneous concept of the heavens as an inverted bowl capping the earth, he nowhere asserts that this concept is a true one; he is not directly interested in the sciences of astronomy, biology, paleontology, geology, and the like, but only in delivering in a way understandable to the people the message given him by God. We can not wholly agree, therefore, with Father Duffy's occasional reference to "primitive elements" and "primitive concepts" in the sacred record. That record, for all that it is human, is also divine. It is a formal, official history, and as such no "primitive elements" can enter into or become a part of the message given.

Before discussing the people who are the subject of the sacred history, we must call attention to a statement in the article under consideration. The author states (p. 40) that "we may lay it down as a principle that the Old Testament writings were intended primarily for Old Testament times . . ." If we consider those writings in the aggregate, the principle has some validity; but whether in a specific instance a given text was given primarily for Old Testament times, would depend on the purport of the text in question. If it be, as the author points out, a radical mistake to read *into* these writings the fuller teaching of Christian revelation, it does not follow that we make a mistake in reading *out of* a text a doctrine which we know more clearly from the Gospels, even if the doctrine were not envisaged by the human author originally.

We have no certain knowledge of the comprehensiveness of the hagiographer's knowledge and appreciation of the message given him to deliver. As a perfectly obvious example, a given typical sense (which is a true sense of Scripture) is read out of many an Old Testament text; it has been revealed to us, but we have no reason for suspecting that the hagiographer was aware of it. Even in the matter of a strictly literal sense, it is possible for us to understand today what was hidden at the time of the delivery of the message to the Chosen People. While, for instance, Isaias' term, *El Gibbor,* undoubtedly predicates Divinity of the Messias, the people who heard him would not have understood; nor can we with certainty assert that the prophet himself was wholly aware of the full meaning of the term, since to the end of his message he continues to portray God as one Person. As we have said on a previous occasion in these pages (September, 1942, p. 228), we must carefully distinguish between what the Old Testament people might obtain from a text, and what the text itself actually asserts; the two, while frequently identical, may on occasion be quite different. If, as St. Augustine says, "*Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet, Vetus Testamentum in Novo patet,*" we do not have to understand the word *latet* in the sense of non-existent rather than in its true meaning of hidden. It is the office of competent authority to decide whether a meaning is non-existent or only hidden, and we are in complete agreement with the author when he warns that reading ideas into the text which were not envisaged by the human author may lead the unwary far astray. None the less it should be kept clearly in mind that since God is the principal Author, it is quite possible to draw from the sacred text at times "ideas and sentiments and doctrines which were not envisaged by the human author" (p. 40).

This divine and human record concerns a people apart,—the Chosen People, the Hebrews, the Jews. In the present state of Biblical studies outside of the Church, and to some extent inside too, sufficient attention has not been given to this segregation, although it is clearly portrayed in the sacred pages. Regardless of their fidelity or infidelity, the Chosen People were separated from other peoples geographically and ideologically for the greater part of their history. At the very beginning of their existence as a nation, they were segregated for forty years in the desert, and in that period there was a fullness of divine revelation which in sheer quantity dwarfed all subsequent periods; it was a special period of formation, and the foundations were solidly laid for all their subsequent history. In the years that immediately followed there was open and commanded opposition to the surrounding peoples, an opposition that in greater or less degree was to mark the nation until the Exile, and to become a dominant characteristic of the post-exilic centuries.

It is but rash surmise, therefore, to presume that the Chosen People had such practices, followed such superstitions, as we find common to other Semitic peoples; it is something still to be proved, not something to be taken for granted. For this reason we find it hard to accept Father Duffy's statement that "the truth of God had to live side by side with uncouth, traditional beliefs and practices, some of which ... were not regarded as uncouth or erroneous" (p. 43). When he further states that "apart from the central devotion to the one true God, the Hebrews seem to have inherited but a vague and scanty knowledge of the providential purpose in relation to man" (p. 43), he overlooks not only the main Messianic thread which runs through the Old Testament, and the far from scanty knowledge of God portrayed in the Psalms, the Prophets, the Wisdom literature, but also the special attitude of the hagiographers generally, in attributing to God directly and independently of secondary causes all activity of nature.

Possibly the author, in referring to "the providential purpose" (a rather vague expression, due possibly to a typographical omission), had in mind the final end of man, and the notion of the future life as depicted in the sacred record; for he makes much of "the defective notion of the hereafter" (p. 44). But here too we are not wholly in agreement with his general impression of the Hebrew Sheol. We freely admit that in comparison with our idea the Hebrew notion of the hereafter was defective; but we should like to point out two things with respect to it which have not received sufficient consideration.

First of all, if the future life received little emphasis in the earlier centuries of the Hebrews' history, there was good reason for it. We must not forget that for four hundred years before the advent of Moses, the Hebrews had lived in Egypt where they were constantly exposed to a developed concept of the future life that was indelibly stamped with polytheism; hence to have emphasized life after death in the earlier centuries would have kept alive in the minds of the people a polytheistic strain from which they were to be weaned. In ensuing centuries, emphasis on the future life—the *fact* of which had never been denied—became more definite, and for recognizable reasons. For though in the earliest times there was instilled into the people a corporate unity under God, with salvation dependent on communal solidarity, little by little the people grew dissatisfied, and sought a monarchical system of rule, similar to what they observed among the surrounding nations, before the time set for the coming of the King of Kings. Having made themselves like unto other nations, they ultimately suffered the fate of nations,—the loss of corporate unity and national character. With the change in sociological conditions, the ideas of individual responsibility, instruction and guidance that was more definitely personal (as in the Wisdom literature), and notions of reward and punishment in the hereafter became more emphatically present, and remained until the close of the Old Testament.

The second point is of greater importance, and concerns the descriptions of Sheol that have been transmitted to us in the sacred record. Just how defective were these descriptions as a whole? Father Duffy equates them with "the mediaeval conception of Limbo" (p. 45), but from the way he expresses the equivalence it is not clear that he realizes how very close to an important but never mentioned truth he has come. The actuality is that Sheol *was* a Limbo! As the Divine Author knew (whatever be said of the human author), the gates of Heaven were closed from Adam to Christ; that being true, there was no future life in the sense in which we visualize it, now that the gates are open. No wonder, then, that the Psalmist should plead for an extension of life on earth where he could still praise God and be usefully employed in His service, rather than for the helplessness of Sheol where he could only mark time until He should come who would liberate him. If the hagiographer knew little of life after death, there was little for him to know; if his Sheol were a place of shadow and gloom, the Light had not yet dawned; and an All-knowing Author permitted His instruments to sense and to portray—however vaguely—what was actual fact.

Father Duffy's suspicion (p. 44) that the famous Machabean parenthesis (II Mach. 12:44), concerning resurrection and prayers for the dead, may be an indication that the doctrine of the resurrection was a new idea coming practically at the close of the Old Testament account, loses effectiveness if we consider the history of the period. It was a time of bribery and corruption in high places; even the highest position in the religious life of the people, the office of high priest, was bought and sold on political grounds; the highest religious authority became the tool of changing civil administrations because of the greed and lust for power and influence of a few who allowed themselves to be Hellenized and led away from the traditions of their race. It was precisely against this control of the Synagogue by a pagan state that the Machabees rose in revolt and gathered to their banner all the truly religious men of the nation in opposition. The people therefore were split into two factions,—those who followed the traditions of their forefathers, and those who sought the new, Hellenizing way.

The former showed their opposition to encroaching paganism by more and more emphatic adherence to traditional beliefs and practices. Their most famous descendants of Messianic times were the Pharisees, men still careful and precise about external practices but without the sincerity of heart and singleness of purpose of their progenitors. The latter, the Hellenizing faction, paid heavily for their greed and sycophancy in a loss of faith personally, and in being the progenitors of the indifferent, skeptic Sadducees of the time of Our Lord. Reason enough, it would seem, for the author of Machabees to point out that resurrection from the dead was a doctrine fully in accord with ancient beliefs, at a time when the highest religious teaching authority had become irreligious and agnostic through unseemly bribery and greed for power, and could use its influence to obscure and deride traditional doctrines.

Lest what has thus far been considered present an unfavorable impression of the worth of Father Duffy's article, we must assert emphatically, before concluding our examination, that the article in question is a valuable contribution to the theological aspect of the Old Testament. If we differ in interpreting some of the background of the older

Scripture, we are in fullest accord with his assertion that the New Testament is fully sufficient as a foundation for essential dogmas of Christianity, even for creation, human solidarity, the fall, etc., for which we have the emphatic evidence of St. Paul. As the writer notes, in these days of muddled thinking, of interpretations along mythical lines of the early chapters of Genesis, the foundations of our faith rest secure; even if by an impossibility rationalist criticism were capable of proving its contention that not history but myth lay behind the story of creation and the fall, we would still have the Epistle to the Romans as an unshakable foundation for our faith. Theologians may turn to Genesis to supplement the evidence of Christian tradition, but "in no case, I think, is the Old Testament invoked as the sole witness of our belief" (p. 41). Never will it be proved that the provenance of Genesis is mythical, but it is a comfort to know that the foundations of our beliefs are safe despite the struggles by trial and error that must still continue before the accuracy and historicity of the early chapters of Genesis are fully recognized.

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CATHOLIC MILITARY LEADERS

The career of a soldier has always been regarded by Catholic theologians and spiritual writers as fraught with moral dangers. Some of the statements of the early Fathers regarding the obstacles to salvation encountered by those who enlisted in the army of the Roman Empire, if taken literally, would give the impression that these Fathers considered the military profession as entirely irreconcilable with a Christian life. Tertullian, in his *De Corona*, depicts a single Christian soldier as steadfast to his religious principles in a camp, and contrasts him with the others "who had imagined that they could serve two masters."[1] Vehemently does the dour African writer denounce various features of military life:

> Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take part in the battle, when it does not become him even to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain and the prison and the torture and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs? Shall he, forsooth, either keep watch-service for others more than for Christ, or shall he do it on the Lord's day, when he does not even do it for Christ Himself? And shall he keep guard before the temples which he has renounced? And shall he take a meal where the apostle has forbidden it? Shall he carry a flag hostile to Christ? . . . Then, how many other offences are involved in the performance of camp offices, which we must hold to involve a transgression of God's law, you may see by a slight survey.[2]

From other passages of the early writers, it is true, we learn that even in the first three centuries it was not considered absolutely wrong for a Christian to be a soldier. Thus, St. Basil, eulogizing the forty martyrs of Sebaste, says that even in the armies of pagan rulers there were many Christians.[3] The condemnation of such service by the Fathers evidently meant, therefore, that the military profession was joined to many occasions of sin and could not be recommended in general to those who claimed to accept the lofty moral standards of Christianity. Even after the edict of Constantine, soldiers were still urged to profess idolatry by some commanders, as is evident from the twelfth canon of the Council of Nicaea, which decreed a severe penance on those who had returned to the army after being discharged from military service.[4]

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[1] *Liber de Corona*, I, *PL*, II, 76.
[2] *Ibid.*, II, *PL*, II, 92.
[3] *PG*, 31, 512.

It cannot be said that the lapse of time has substantially changed the attitude of the Church as to the special moral hazards of the soldier. Some of the older theologians even seemed to consider it an established fact that all soldiers lead a dissolute life—a supposition which fortunately we can deny today in relation to the young men in the armed forces of our country. Thus, St. Alphonsus takes over the opinion of Busembaum that it would not be a grave sin of detraction to relate of a soldier that he has a concubine, because such a revelation would not notably diminish the reputation which normally belongs to a soldier.[5]

Whatever may be thought of the desirability of the military life for Catholics, we are today faced with the fact of universal conscription. At present this is a war-time measure; yet it is not improbable that after the war a year or two of obligatory military service for all young men will become a permanent policy in our country. In any event, the army and navy will surely be much larger than ever before; consequently, we can expect to have a considerable number of Catholics in the military and naval service.

Catholic soldiers and sailors should be familiar with the teachings of their Church relevant to the particular problems and difficulties which they are likely to encounter. Those Catholics especially who hold posts of authority in army or navy should be well instructed in the doctrinal and moral tenets of their religion which they are called on to apply in the course of their professional activities. There is no branch of public employment which confers on its leaders greater responsibility and authority over the lives and actions of their subordinates than the military service; consequently, a Catholic officer in the army or navy is in a position to exercise an extraordinary influence for good on the men he commands. Conversely, the failure of such an officer to live up to his religious obligations can have grave moral consequences for his men. It is incumbent on the priests of our country—not only chaplains but all members of the clergy who may come in contact with military men—to be prepared to explain to them, clearly and logically, the norms of right and wrong which must regulate their professional activities, if they are to be consistent with the principles of the religion they profess.

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[4] These soldiers had enlisted in the army of Licinius, a champion of paganism. Cf. Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils*, p. 41.

[5] *Theologia Moralis*, Lib. III, 967.

The chief problems facing the officers of our armed service can be grouped under three general headings—faith, sex morality, and the ethics of warfare. Under the first heading comes especially the matter of communication and co-operation in non-Catholic religious worship. The officer has under his command men of various religious beliefs. On the one hand, he must avoid every form of discrimination for or against a soldier because of his religious affiliation. The Catholics of the United States are wholeheartedly in favor of the policy of equal freedom in the practice of religion for all American citizens, whether in official or in civil life. Accordingly, the Catholic army or navy officer may not in any way hinder the religious activities of his men, whatever their creed, provided there is no interference involved with discipline and the reasonable demands of military duty. If the post chapel is intended for the use of Protestants and Jews as well as Catholics, he should see that it is available at convenient times for each of these denominations. If a group of soldiers of a particular sect, desirous of attending some form of service not conducted on the post, wish to go to a neighboring town for that purpose, he may—and ordinarily should—provide free time and transportation. To the non-Catholic chaplains under his jurisdiction he should extend the same courtesy and liberty of action that he grants to the chaplains of his own denomination. This method of procedure on the part of a Catholic officer involves *material* co-operation toward a form of worship which he firmly believes to be erroneous, but in the armed forces of our country there are circumstances which always justify material co-operation of this type.

On the other hand, the Catholic officer must refuse all *active* participation and *formal* co-operation in the public religious services of any non-Catholic denomination. For, according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, such services are at variance with the law of God, and consequently it is a grave sin to participate in them actively or to co-operate formally in their performance. Thus, it might happen that the only chaplain on a navy vessel is a Protestant. The commanding officer, a Catholic, could never lawfully take part in the Protestant services conducted by this chaplain, by singing the hymns, answering the prayers, etc. On special occasions, as a matter of official courtesy, he could assist reverently at such services without taking any active part—for example, at the funeral rites for a non-Catholic member of the crew. Indeed, in the event that only a non-Catholic chaplain is available for the burial of a Catholic, this chaplain could recite approved Catholic prayers and there would be no objection to an active participation by Catholics in this function.

A memorandum from the Secretary of War, given on August 21, 1942, directs that "commanders must render every practicable aid to chaplains to assist them in the performance of their duties." As was noted above, material co-operation on the part of a Catholic officer toward non-Catholic religious worship, by providing free time for the men, the use of a building or chapel, transportation, etc., is quite compatible with Catholic moral principles, because of the justifying reasons, which are always present. Furthermore, exhortations of a general nature to be faithful to the duties of religion, to serve God devoutly, to pray, etc., can be given by a Catholic to persons of any religious denonination, without any compromise of his religious tenets. But it is difficult to see how a Catholic could urge non-Catholics to participate in their particular denominational services, since such services are objectively based on false beliefs or at least are conducted in contravention of the authority of the one true Church. *A fortiori*, a Catholic officer could not counsel or command a Catholic to take active part in a non-Catholic service. This point has been added because it has happened in our navy that certain sailors have been trained specially to be assistants to chaplains, in such wise that their duties include the function of playing the organ for the services of any chaplain, whatever his denomination, to whom they happen to be assigned. Now, it is unhesitatingly admitted by Catholic theologians, upheld by decisions of the Church, that the playing of the organ at a public non-Catholic religious service is an unlawful mode of participation.[6] Hence, no Catholic commander could in conscience require a Catholic soldier or sailor to perform this function.

These are but a few of the problems connected with faith which a Catholic in a post of authority in the army or navy may have to meet. No reasons of expediency or diplomacy or personal advantage will ever justify him in violating the moral principles flowing from the basic tenet of his faith that Catholicism is the only true religion and the Catholic Church is the only divinely approved religious organization on earth. An uncompromising attitude will inevitably involve the Catholic officer in difficult and embarrassing situations from time to time, but he should take advantage of such situations to explain the logic of his stand. The letter of our Military Ordinariate to the army and naval chaplains, sent out on August 14, 1943, contains a paragraph which can be addressed to all Catholics in the armed service: "To drive home your point, it may be necessary to explain to non-Catholics that all the millions of martyrs of the early ages of the Church were martyrs simply because they refused to participate in worship other than their own—and add that the Church, following the injunction of Christ Himself, expects her people to continue to give their lives for the sacred principle upon which liberty of conscience is based. The Church expects martyrs, and will always have them."

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[6] Bancroft, *Communication in Religious Worship with Non-Catholics*, (Washington, D. C., Cath. Univ., 1943), p. 72 f.

It is well to note that the frank and outspoken policy of our Military Ordinariate in presenting to army and navy officials the attitude which Catholics must in conscience follow in relation to non-Catholic religious beliefs and worship has done much toward obviating the difficulties encountered in the service by our Catholic soldiers and sailors.

The second class of problems devolving on Catholic officers concerns the matter of sex morality. The desire of some soldiers to satisfy their sexual urge by illicit relations has always been a source of trouble and difficulty in army life. Some armies have attempted to solve this problem by providing the soldiers with a supply of prostitutes. Even in our own army there have been (and perhaps still are) high-ranking officers who believed that regulated prostitution is the most effective method of keeping the men contented. It is to the credit of General John Pershing that when our armies landed in France in 1917 he took a firm stand against the system advocated by the French (particularly Clemenceau) and put houses of prostitution out of bounds for the American troops.[7] A strenuous campaign for the continuance of this same uncompromising policy has been waged for years by Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service (who is a Catholic). Consequently, repression of prostitution is the official system of the United States army and navy at the present day. Thus, on March 18, 1942, the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, wrote to the governors of all the states: "I urge that you fully understand the navy's policy of repression in relation to the practice or toleration of prostitution in any form." Five days later, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote to the governors in a similar vein: "I am responsible to the parents of these splendid young men in the army for seeing to it that they are not surrounded by a vicious and demoralizing environment. . . . This means closing segregated districts and ending the farce of periodic examinations of prostitutes, as well as intelligent police follow-up that keeps out the profiteers on vice."

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[7] Parran, *Plain Words About Venereal Diseases,* (New York, 1941), p. 70 f.

To what extent this policy is actually upheld by the officers in service with our armed forces will not be discussed here. The point to be emphasized now is that a Catholic officer would never be justified in promoting or approving any form of prostitution, whether regulated or not, on the score that it helps to relieve the nervous strain of the soldiers or that it diminishes crimes of violence in the vicinty of the post, etc. For, in corroboration of the official stand of the army and navy, the Catholic officer is supported in his repressive measures by the teachings of theologians and by the findings of recent social investigators. Although some of the older theologians regarded the toleration of commercialized vice as the lesser of two evils, this view is commonly rejected today. The claim that the toleration of prostitution diminishes rape is thus answered by the United States Public Health Service: "A careful study of those cities which abolished the red light district shows that in almost every case there is less rape after than before the line was closed."[8] Accordingly, the Catholic military officer has the duty of using his authority to repress prostitution within the sphere of his jurisdiction.

Despite the official attitude of our military authorities toward organized vice, provisions are made for supplying soldiers and sailors with contraceptive devices as a protection against venereal diseases. A War Department order, issued on February 23, 1942, at the instance of the Military Ordinariate, forbids local commanders to oblige men to take condoms when they go on leave. However, there is still a general ruling that these articles shall be available to the soldiers. The question naturally presents itself: "May a Catholic officer concur toward the distribution of condoms—e.g. by ordering them for his post exchange?" It is not an easy problem to solve, at least by an unqualified answer. It must be remembered that the co-operation of an officer in this case is merely material, though quite proximate. Generally speaking, therefore, there would seem to be sufficient reason to permit this type of co-operation, in the same manner that a clerk in a drug store is allowed to sell contraceptive instruments, if grave inconveniences would otherwise come to him.[9] But, at any rate, a Catholic officer would never be allowed to tell his men—as is sometimes done by other officers, and even by those who vehemently condemn illicit sexual indulgence—"If, despite all that has been said to you, some of you decide to have relations with a prostitute, at least protect your health by wearing a condom." For, such advice, though it suggests what is the lesser of two evils from the *physical* standpoint, is a recommendation of the graver of two *moral* evils.

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[8] Quoted by Rev. John A. O'Brien, "Can We Crush Commercialized Vice?" in *The Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, October, 1938, p. 33.

[9] Wouters, *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*, (Bruges, 1932), n. 565.

The third class of moral problems encountered by military officers centers about the ethics of warfare. Sad to say, there are not a few military men nowadays who believe that any measures whatsoever that will defeat the enemy and secure a speedier and more decisive victory may be employed. No Catholic can admit such a principle. There are certain norms of right and wrong relative to the waging of war which must be maintained. For example, there is no justification for the slaying of a captured enemy soldier, at least after he has been disarmed and rendered incapable of doing any harm. This holds true, even if the captive belongs to a nation that has ruthlessly slaughtered our soldiers after capture or surrender. Two wrongs do not make a right. Again, the rules of civilized warfare, if not the natural law, call for a distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants. Only the former may be attacked and killed directly; at most the killing of the latter may be permitted in connection with a justifiable and important military operation, such as the destruction of an ammunition dump. To slay non-combatants (for example, housewives and children) in a designed attack on non-military objectives, such as a residential section, on the score that the consequent terror and discouragement may lead to the enemy's surrender, is simply murder.

It is true, in modern warfare it is difficult in many cases to decide on the correct application of principles. For example, may the workers in an ammunition factory be directly attacked, on the grounds that their work brings them into the class of combatants? It would seem that this question could be answered in the affirmative. But what is to be said of those who work in the mines and the oil-wells, the trainmen, the clerks in a war administration office, the telegraphers, etc.? These questions are not easy to answer. The soldier under orders may follow the principle that lawful authority is to be obeyed unless it is evident that what is commanded is sinful. But those who wield authority should realize that human life is sacred, that they may not cause even indirectly the death of a single citizen of the hostile nation except when certain conditions are fulfilled, particularly a due proportion between the good effect and the evil. It is impossible for moralists to render definite decisions as to the lawfulness of some of the military operations now in progress—for example, the wholesale bombing of Europe. Certain facts will have to be known before a reasoned opinion can be given, particularly the precise objectives which are the direct targets of this destruction, and the proportion between the harm which can be foreseen (especially the extent of civilian carnage) and the military advantages which can reasonably be expected. Only when these facts are made known, will theologians be able to apply the principles of Catholic teaching to particular cases and to give a decision.

At any rate, despite the difficulty of determining right and wrong in many particular cases, military officials should bear in mind the general principle that the law of God takes precedence over expediency, and that if a method of warfare is wrong, it may not be employed, even though it might be helpful to a speedier and a more certain victory. Catholics especially must be mindful of this fundamental moral truth, for, as the world is going now, the Catholic Church will soon be alone in upholding unchangeable standards of morality.

It is unfortunately true that not a few Catholics who attain to high posts in army and navy ranks become careless and indifferent in the practice of their faith. Their environments are not favorable to a fervent Catholic life, and often a mixed marriage adds to the difficulties. On the other hand, there are splendid examples of men who have risen to important positions in the military or naval profession and have nevertheless been models of solid Catholic piety, proving that it is possible to be both a devout Catholic and a loyal and capable soldier or sailor. And one of the important tasks of the clergy of our country, whether chaplains or parish priests, is to give our soldiers and sailors, whether officers or subordinates, the attention and the spiritual care necessary to provide them with the knowledge of their faith and to inspire them to put it consistently into practice.

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SANCTUARY TO CINEMA

Perhaps it is a long way from the theatre down the street to a Benedictine monastery back in the ninth century, but it is not so hard to make the connection. There was a time when the theatre was the monastery and the actors were the monks. It was the day of Notker Babulus. Brother Notker did not steal the show. After a fashion, he made it.

The description we have of Brother Notker does not exactly fit a movie star. He was slow of gait and had an emaciated body. He had an inveterate stammer which got him the nickname, "Babulus." But he made his monastery the Hollywood of his day. There was a reason.

The classical drama died with the fall of the Roman Empire. In the lusty days of the Caesars, drama had been an art. As an art, it could not live when civilization grew sick. When the stage became the show-place of too-real crime and vice, there simply was no room left for the product of a healthy civilization. The Fathers of the Church were forced to form the first Legion of Decency, which literally cleared the stage.

One piece stands out as an early attempt to rehabilitate the theatre. The subject was the passion of Christ and the sorrows of the Blessed Virgin. It was long considered to be a fourth century work, and was supposed to have been written by St. Gregory Nazianzen. It was organized on the plan of the Greek tragedy and contained several hundred lines of Euripides. Nineteenth century historians have proved that it was not written by St. Gregory and could not have been much earlier than the sixth century.

We have something of the same sort in the six plays of Hroswitha, a Benedictine nun of Gandersheim in Saxony, in about the tenth century. Hroswitha attempted to write Christian moral plays on the style of Terence. She also attempted one comedy which failed pretty badly. Her plays got some notice in her day but have not left much mark on the development of the drama.

It is really to Brother Notker at the monastery of St. Gall in Switzerland that we owe the reappearance of the dramatic story. It seems the whole thing started as a short-cut to learning music. Notker had come to St. Gall very young and he was put to studying Gregorian chant. He had difficulties. He could not remember the protracted melody of the *jubilus* of the Gradual Alleluia-verse. He soon discovered that if he made up some words, one note to one syllable, he could remember the melody. One day a French monk came to St. Gall and showed Notker a Missal in which his idea had been anticipated. From then on, Notker worked at the idea seriously.

He improved the French method and wrote a text for an Easter Alleluia-melody used at St. Gall. He showed it to his teacher, Iso, who was duly impressed. An Irish scholar in the house urged the young musician to write a volume of the word-melodies, which have come to be called sequences, and to dedicate it to some prominent person. Notker modestly declined, but in 885, on further encouragement from his brother, Othar, a wealthy nobleman, he dedicated a volume to Liutward, Bishop of Vercelli.

Notker had arrived. He wrote some forty texts and thirty-five melodies which were used at St. Gall and such monasteries as Reichenau, Einsiedeln, Constance and other dependencies of St. Gall.

His sequences were the "hit-songs" of the day. They were sung not only in churches but also out-of-doors, by the young and old; by the farmer at his plow and by soldiers on the march.

But while Notker was writing his sequences, a friend and brother monk, Tuotilo, was making a name with tropes which were, briefly, musical commentaries inserted into various sung parts of the Mass. Together, Notker and Tuotilo revived the classical dramatic tradition. Notker wrote the sequences; Tuotilo wrote the tropes.

The oldest St. Gall codex contains the sequences and tropes of these two friends and brother artists. The oldest St. Gall trope is a dialogue between the angels, (the monastic choir) and the Marys, (ministers in the sanctuary), sung before the Easter Mass:

Choir: "Whom seek ye in the sepulchre, O Christians?"
Marys: "Jesus of Nazareth Crucified, O heavenly ones."
Choir: "He is not here, He is risen, as He said; go and announce that He is risen from the grave."

Then all together sang the Introit of the Mass: "I arose and am still with thee, Alleluia."

Here we have the first two steps in the restoration of the drama. Brother Notker wrote explanatory dramatic texts to carry the Alleluia-melody. Brother Tuotilo carried the idea a step further with explanatory text and melody in dialogue. It was but a short way to the fusion of dramatic action.

The monks of St. Gall, carrying on the Benedictine liturgical tradition, sought to make the Divine Services as artistic and impressive as possible. Dramatic action was soon introduced into the Easter services.

A large veil was hung upon the altar to represent the sepulchre. During the third nocturne of the Easter matins, a monk, robed in a white alb to represent the angel, took his place before the sepulchre. Then three other monks, representing the Marys, approached the sepulchre, swinging censers and looking about as if searching. The first monk, the angel, asked, "Whom seek ye in the sepulchre?" And the dialogue went on as before till the words, "Come see the place where the Lord was laid," when the angel removed the cloth showing that the tomb was empty. The three Marys took the cloth and showed it to the monks in the choir. Then all sang the antiphon, "The Lord is risen from the grave," and the abbot intoned the *Te Deum*, concluding the matins.

We need look no further for the essentials of the drama. In this simple tenth century Easter religious service, we have all the elements of story, dialogue and action. It is interesting to note, however, that the St. Gall Resurrection play took on grander proportions, opening with the question, "Who shall roll us back the stone?" It included the entire congregation as pilgrims to the tomb and closed with the placing of a Consecrated Host, the Risen Christ, in the Easter Sepulchre.

Nor was the Resurrection play the only drama employed in the St. Gall liturgy. There were similar tropes and dramatic situations for various feasts. There was a Christmas trope from which we have the crib and the custom of singing carols. There was an Offertory trope for Epiphany. A star was hung in the rear of the church. As the Wise Men approached, the star was pulled along by a rope to the altar where the Three Kings placed their gifts. There was an excellent Introit trope for Ascension. There were plays for the feasts of St. Catherine, St. Nicholas, St. Stephen, St. John, and others.

A rather quaint ceremony grew up around the feast of the Holy Innocents. The best-behaved boy in the abbey school was elected abbot for the day. He selected two of his playmates as chaplains, received bread and wine as symbols of homage, marched in procession to the church, knelt at the abbot's prayer-bench and intoned the antiphon at choir at which his classmates sang the entire canonical office. Special tropes and sequences graced the occasion, which was concluded with boyish mirth and pageantry.

The liturgical pageant was not long confined to St. Gall but soon spread out of the country to France and England. Nor was it many centuries before these purely church functions had to be staged out-of-doors. The churches were not big enough to hold the crowds. They moved into the church yards. Most church yards were cemeteries and there was danger of profaning the graves. The plays were taken to the court yards of the inns, to the town squares. They traveled from town to town, and finally landed in homes of their own, the theatres.

It would not be difficult to trace the drama from the simple sequences of Brother Notker down through the Moralities and Interludes, through Shakespeare to our own Broadway and Hollywood.

From the liturgical tropes, the drama went to other Biblical situations. When the stories of the Old Testament and the miracles of the New Law were exhausted, apocryphal, traditional legends were portrayed. Mary bought oil on the Sabbath to anoint the body of Christ. But the Jewish law forbade buying and selling on the Sabbath. Mary must have bought the oil from a smuggler. So there was the story of Mary and the Smuggler. There was the story of the soldiers arguing at the tomb, and many others. As these less orthodox elements came in, the clergy took less and less part in the plays. For the most part, the plays were turned over to the trade guilds.

The miracle plays were given a fresh start by the decree of the Council of Vienne, 1311, setting the feast of Corpus Christi on the Thursday after Trinity Sunday. The feast was adopted by the guilds as the chief festival of the year. Formerly every guild had a play of its own. Now they combined their plays into one grand performance of matter from the beginning of the world to the Day of Judgment to celebrate the feast. Each play was given several times in different parts of the city. The guildsmen managed to stay pretty well in character. The vintners took the Cana miracle, the shepherds the feast of Christmas, the goldbeaters the feast of the Three Kings, and the shipwrights had the Noah story.

As men became too busy making money, some of the guilds would pay professional casts to take their part in the Corpus Christi pageant. When the guilds were dissolved in the sixteenth century, the Miracle plays were no longer enacted. For a while they were adequately replaced by the Morality plays, dramas personifying good and evil. One of the earliest of these was *The Lord's Prayer*, in which all manner of vices were held up to scorn and the virtues were held up to praise. Another very early Morality was the *Creed* play. Perhaps the best remembered today is *Everyman*.

Although the Moralities, in various forms, carried over till Elizabethan drama and Shakespeare, they were not highly successful, often being unreal and undramatic. They were certainly not what Brother Notker intended.

We have come a long way from Brother Notker and Brother Tuotilo, from the sanctuary to the cinema. However that may be, we can be pretty certain that the sequences of Notker and the tropes of Tuotilo will still be living art when the curtain has long since gone down on Hollywood and the movie. Brother Notker gained another and even more lasting fame. He was beatified in 1512.

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THE NEW ENCYCLICAL ON BIBLICAL STUDIES PART TWO: THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE

THE LITERAL SENSE

After stressing the necessity of adequate linguistic attainments and of textual criticism, the Encyclical discusses what it calls the most exalted of all the tasks entrusted to the Catholic exegete, the discovery and exposition of the genuine meaning of the Sacred Books. The precepts which it lays down for this purpose are in no sense revolutionary; they merely summarize the doctrine found in the accepted Catholic treatises on the interpretation of the Bible. It is to be hoped that this doctrine, which is so strongly approved by Papal authority, will effectually discourage those well-intentioned but misguided individuals who read their own pious musings into the text, with an amazing disregard of the requirements of logic and language.

All those who imagine that the Scriptures have an esoteric meaning not immediately deducible from the language and the context will be bitterly disappointed when they note the emphasis placed upon the *literal sense.* 'When executing this task, interpreters are to bear in mind that to discriminate clearly and define the so-called *literal* sense is their greatest concern. They are to make every effort to deduce this *literal* meaning of the words by having recourse to linguistic science, to the context, and to the comparative study of similar passages; in fact, all these methods are the usual aids employed in the interpretation of a work of profane literature, in order that the thought of the author may become lucidly manifest."[1]

Since the Encyclical is addressed primarily to those who are professionally interested in the Scriptures, it does not define the *literal sense* at this juncture. To avoid misconceptions it may not be superfluous to recall the definition given by the best authorities. They agree substantially in declaring it to be the meaning immediately expressed by the words.[2] This meaning may be clothed in metaphorical language, e.g., Isaias pictures the rulers of the post-exilic Jews as "dumb dogs, unable to bark, dreaming, napping, loving to slumber" (56: 10). The primary, non-figurative sense of the words is assumed, however, unless the contrary is sufficiently manifest.

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[1] *ASS,* Vol. XXXV, Oct. 20, 1944 (NCWC, Febr. 20, 1944), p. 310.

[2] Cf. A. Fernandez, S. J., *Hermeneutica,* in *Institutiones Biblicae,* Vol. I, 2nd ed. (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1927), p. 296.

Though not by definition excluding metaphor and allegory, the *literal sense* is opposed to the *accommodated*, which takes the words out of their context and applies them in a way not intended by the author. The *literal sense* is defined as *immediate* for two reasons. In the first place, this appellation distinguishes it from ulterior conclusions which the reader may draw by reasoning upon the statement of the writer. Secondly, it differentiates the *literal sense* from the *typical*, which is mediate, being attached to the object defined by means of the words.

According to the Encyclical, therefore, the exegete is to follow the procedure which right reason prescribes for the understanding of any work of literature. He should be conversant with all the significations which a particular word or phrase may have, or at least be able to consult intelligently a comprehensive dictionary of the language in which the text was written. He must bear in mind that a particular word or phrase may possibly not be used in its primary sense but may have a derived or figurative meaning. To ascertain which of the possible meanings applies in a particular instance he must scrutinize the grammatical and logical context. The former will show him the grammatical relations subsisting between words, phrases, clauses, and sentences. The latter will reveal to him the manner in which the author develops his theme in successive sentences, paragraphs, and sections. In some cases the exegete will be forced to examine and compare all the passages in which a certain word or phrase is used by the author or by his contemporaries. If all these methods fail to yield a satisfactory sense, an examination of the manner in which the cognate root or a similar expression is employed in the other literatures of the Near East may open the way to a successful solution.

Now the Bible is a divinely inspired book, and God has appointed the Church to be its guardian and authentic interpreter. Hence, as the Encyclical notes, the Catholic exegete must not only observe the scientific rules of interpretation, "he must also take into account, with no less solicitude, the explanations and declarations proceeding from the teaching authority of the Church together with the exegesis of the Holy Fathers and also 'the analogy of faith,' as Leo XIII very wisely observes in the Encyclical Letter, *Providentissimus Deus*."[3] All texts which have not been defined in some way by the Church should be interpreted in such a manner that the sense attributed to them harmonizes with every other revealed doctrine. The interpretation fulfilling this requirement will be according to the analogy of faith. The Encyclical does not determine the binding force which a particular decision of the Church or the exposition of the Fathers may have. It supposes this to be known from the teaching of the theologians on the matter. The subject is too large to receive adequate treatment here; this may be found in the standard books on Hermeneutics.[4]

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[3] *AAS, loc. cit.*

As we have seen, the Holy Father strongly urges the use of modern research in history, archeology, philology, and related sciences to illustrate the Bible. But he is far from considering this to be the major function of a commentator. He deplores the fact that some recent commentaries confine their notes to these topics. He declares that Catholic exegetes, while not neglecting the results of research, should make it a special point to bring out the theological content of individual books and passages, i.e., their teaching on faith and morals. Thus, as he explains, they will be able to render effective assistance to professors of theology and instructors in Christian doctrine; thus, too, will they aid the faithful in leading holy lives, befitting the dignity of a Christian.[5]

By making their interpretation predominantly theological "they will effectually silence those who claim that they can scarcely find anything in biblical commentaries which raises the mind to God, nourishes the soul, and fosters the interior life, and so maintain that we must resort to a species of interpretation which they term spiritual and mystical. How far this assertion is from being correct is taught by the experience of many who have perfected their souls and have been inspired with an intense love of God by a repeated consideration of and meditation upon the word of God. This is, also, clearly manifest from the constant practice of the Church and the counsels of the most eminent Doctors."[6]

THE FULLER LITERAL SENSE

The *literal sense* advocated by the Encyclical does not exclude the fact that a *fuller sense* may be found in some passages of the Bible. This does not imply that a text may have two disparate meanings neither of which includes the other. It supposes that both God and the human author described exactly the same subject but that the language used by both delineated this subject with a degree of clarity, perfection, and distinctness only partially realized and contemplated by the sacred writer but fully known and intended by the Holy Spirit.

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[4] Cf. Fernandez, *op. cit.*, p. 388 ff.

[5] *AAS, loc. cit.*

[6] *AAS, ibid.*, p. 311.

How this may have occurred is shown by certain passages of the Wisdom Literature. They personify Wisdom, representing it as divine and distinct from God (Prov. 8: 22–31; Ecclus. 24: 5–14; Wis. 7: 22; 8: 1). The human authors of these passages may not have understood that they were describing the Divine Word; this is evident with certainty only from the New Testament.

Another illustration of the *fuller sense* is found in the Messianic prophecies. Each of these depicts some aspect of the Messianic kingdom; none of them views it in all its details. But an aspect or individual feature of an object cannot be fully appreciated unless we see the entire object and the correlation of all its parts. Moreover, the prophets beheld the Messianic kingdom only in the dim light of the Old Testament, not in the splendor of its fulfillment. The Holy Spirit, however, wrote these prophecies not only for those living in Old Testament times but especially for those belonging to the New Dispensation, who were destined to see the realm of the Messias in the clear illumination of its achievement.

Consequently, the language of the Holy Spirit may in some instances have had a significance not fully understood and intended by the prophets, who were the instruments of God. This is the opinion of St. Thomas: "We should know that, since the mind of the prophet is a defective instrument, even true prophets do not know everything that the Holy Spirit intends in their visions or words or actions."[7]

THE CONSEQUENT LITERAL SENSE

The Encyclical does not mention the *consequent sense*, because it is not properly a sense of Sacred Scripture. The *true literal sense*, as we have explained, is that which God intended to express by the words of the sacred writer. The *consequent sense*, however, is the conclusion of a valid syllogism, one premise of which is a scriptural statement while the other is a truth based on natural reason. Hence, even though God foresaw and desired that such conclusions should be drawn, they do not constitute the *literal sense* of Holy Writ in the rigorous acceptance of the term.

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[7] *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 173, a. 4.

A classical instance of the *consequent sense* is found in St. Paul. His declaration that apostles are entitled to sustenance on the part of the faithful is derived from two premises. The first is a quotation from Deut. 25: 4: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain" (1 Cor. 9: 9). The second is in the form of a rhetorical question: "Is it for the oxen that God has care?" This states equivalently that God is more concerned about human beings than domestic animals. He attributes the conclusion which follows from these premises to Sacred Scripture: "Do I speak these things on human authority? Or does not the Law also say these things?" (1 Cor. 9: 7). Consequently, he considers this conclusion to be in some way a sense of Sacred Scripture. We may follow his example by terming the *consequent sense*, *literal* in the broader meaning of the term, for one premise is derived from the Bible, whilst the conjunction of this premise with the other was foreseen by God.

THE MULTIPLE LITERAL SENSE

The *literal sense*, therefore, advocated by the Encyclical is compatible with the *fuller* and the *consequent sense*. It is quite obvious that the *literal sense* may be rendered in two forms, explicitly and implicitly. Thus, the statement of Genesis (1: 26) that God created man to His image and likeness declares implicitly that both Adam and Eve were made in this manner. The *literal sense*, also, does not preclude the possibility that there may be several plausible interpretations of the same passage; this merely means that the exact *literal sense* cannot be unraveled with certainty.

But may we still maintain a *multiple literal sense*? This means that a biblical text may have two or more essentially divergent significations. This oft-debated problem has a theoretical and a practical aspect. In theory, we may admit that God could have given his words many disparate meanings. The question is: Did He do so in fact? This is excluded implicitly by the Encyclical. It teaches that the Holy Spirit used language which is to be interpreted according to the laws governing human speech. But human speech has but one literal meaning unless he who uses it is joking or equivocating or bent upon deception or incapable of expressing himself clearly or unwilling to do so. Since we cannot attribute any of these motives or defects to the Holy Spirit, we are compelled to conclude that Sacred Scripture has but one *literal sense*. Moreover, the exhortation of the Encyclical to make the *literal sense* our primary concern would be futile if we were confronted by the possibility that this might be multitudinous. The arguments which are advanced in favor of a *multiple literal sense* are not difficult to refute and need not concern us here.[8]

THE SPIRITUAL OR TYPICAL SENSE

After condemning the attribution of bizarre and ill-founded meanings to the Bible, the Encyclical restates the doctrine of the Fathers, of St. Thomas, and of other great theologians on the presence of a true *spiritual sense* in some passages of the Scriptures: "For the things which were said or happened in the Old Testament were ordained and disposed by God with such supreme wisdom that occurrences of the past presignified in a spiritual way events of the future in the new covenant of grace. Hence it is the duty of the exegete to discover and expound not only the so-called *literal sense* expressed and intended by the sacred writer but also the spiritual sense, provided there is real evidence that it was conferred by God. For no one but God could have known or revealed this spiritual meaning to us."[9]

From these words of the Encyclical we may draw the following inferences: (1) Every passage has a literal sense; (2) In addition to this literal sense a spiritual sense may be found in some passages; (3) This spiritual sense is not expressed by the words but by the historical realities related in the passages concerned. They have this meaning not by any quality or qualities inherent in themselves but through divine intervention. Moreover, God did not arbitrarily bestow this meaning upon the realities in question but so ordained and disposed the course of events in the Old Testament that these realities by their very existence prefigured future actualities in the New Testament. Since the spiritual sense is entirely due to God, it could be known and revealed by Him alone.

The *spiritual sense*, therefore, predicated by the Encyclical is what is perhaps more commonly known as the *typical sense*. It is termed spiritual because it is ordained and revealed by the Holy Spirit. It is also sometimes designated as the mystical sense, because it unveils mysteries relating to the New Testament.

The person, object, action, or institution of the Old Testament which has this spiritual meaning is called the *type*, while the correlative actuality of the New Testament designated by it is known as the

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[8] Cf. C. Pesch, S.J., *De Inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae*, Ed. prima iterata, (Freiburg: Herder, 1925), p. 563 ff.

[9] *AAS, loc. cit.*

anti-type. Thus the fact that the bones of Christ were not broken is the anti-type, which by divine ordination was predicted by its type, namely, the fact that the Israelites were forbidden to break the bones of the Paschal lamb (Ex. 12: 36 ff.; John 19: 36).[10]

A type has a reason for existence which is independent of its spiritual meaning and which would still be present if it were not a type. Hence it should not be confounded with a prophetic symbol, which has no other reason for its existence than the significance which is attached to it. The beasts, for example, which Daniel (7, 8) saw in his visions were evoked solely to symbolize pagan empires, whereas the Paschal lamb was instituted for other reasons besides its typical meaning (Ex. 12: 1 ff).

St. Paul asserts that the words of Scripture concerning Agar and Sara were uttered in allegory, meaning that Agar and Sara were types (Gal. 4: 24 ff.). It would be erroneous to infer from this that a type is a species of metaphor or an allegory, which is a series of metaphors used to develop a theme. A metaphor, in the strict acceptation of the word, is nothing but an implicit comparison, in which the more familiar and more striking properties of one object are ascribed to another, in order to emphasize corresponding analogous qualities of the latter, e.g., when it is said that Benjamin will be a ravenous wolf (Gen. 49: 27). A metaphor, therefore, merely expresses the attributes inherent in an object, without bestowing upon it an additional meaning of divine origin. It is nothing but another form of the *literal sense.* In the passage quoted above St. Paul uses the notion of allegory in a broad sense, because a metaphor bears some resemblance to a type. Just as a metaphor imparts a new meaning to words differing from the primary meaning, so the typical sense confers another significance upon the object denoted by the words.

Since the *typical sense* can be known only by divine revelation, the Encyclical adduces four sources in one or more of which the revealed meaning of a type may be contained: (1) the words of Jesus Christ cited in the Gospels, (2) the words and writings of the Apostles, (3) the perpetual tradition of the Church, (4) the liturgy, "whenever the well-known principle, 'The Rule of Prayer is the Rule of Faith' may rightfully be applied."[11]

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[10] The term, type, is derived from St. Paul, who calls Adam a type of Christ (Rom. 5: 14), and who describes certain events which befell the Hebrews as types for our instruction (1 Cor. 10: 6, 11). On the other hand the word, anti-type, as used in the sense given above, is borrowed from St. Peter, who refers to Christians undergoing Baptism as the anti-type of those who passed through the waters of the Deluge (I Pet. 3: 21).

Let us see briefly what we may learn concerning the typical sense from these sources. The Fathers and the theologians of every age teach the existence of types in general with such unanimity and conviction that this doctrine may be practically considered a matter of faith.[12]

That the Old Testament as a whole typifies the New is implied by St. Paul, for he declares that the Jewish feasts were a "shadow of things to come" (Col. 2: 16), that the Law had "but a shadow of the good things to come" (Hebr. 10: 1), and that certain events of the Exodus happened to the Jews as a type (1 Cor. 10: 6–11). It would be false, however, to suppose that every detail of the Old Testament portended some feature of the New. This view is without support and leads to grotesque conclusions.

All that can be reasonably defended is that some occurrences of the Old Dispensation have a typical meaning. Our Lord states that the bronze serpent of Moses presignified His own exaltation on the cross (Jn. 3: 14 ff.), and that the episode of Jonas prefigured His own resurrection (Mt. 12: 39 ff.). St. Peter declares that the waters of the Deluge were a type of Baptism (1 Pet. 3: 20 ff.). The Easter Preface proclaims the Paschal lamb to be a type of Christ.

These examples show us how the typical sense may be determined by the sources of revelation.[13] The Holy Father tells us that this typical sense is to be proposed and explained with a diligence proportionate to the dignity of the word of God.

The Encyclical, therefore, acknowledges but two genuine senses of Sacred Scripture: the *literal* and the *spiritual* or *typical*. The recognition of the latter is not left to our own creative imagination but is made dependent upon the clearly professed teaching of revelation. Hence, the Encyclical continues: "Let them conscientiously beware of proposing other transferred meanings as the genuine sense of Sacred Scripture."

THE BROADER USE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE

A somewhat broader or freer use of Scripture is permitted, "provided that this is done with moderation and prudence. It should, however, never be forgotten that this use of the words of Sacred Scripture is in a sense extraneous to it and superadded, and that nowadays especially it is not without peril, for the faithful—those in particular who are instructed in the sacred as well as in the profane sciences—seek what God Himself makes known to us in Holy Writ rather than the things that some eloquent orator or writer expounds with a somewhat dexterous use of the words of the Bible."[14]

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[11] *AAS*, *loc. cit.*

[12] Cf. Pesch, *op. cit.*, p. 567; Fernandez, *op. cit.*, p. 304 ff.

[13] For a practically complete enumeration of the types verified by the New Testament, cf. Pesch, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

Consequently, the Encyclical is not altogether opposed to the use of the *accommodated sense.* This consists in referring the words of the sacred writer to some person or object not contemplated by him in the context. This sense is employed in the prudent manner suggested by the Encyclical if there is some analogy between the subject-matter of the text and the object to which it is applied. Thus, there is a close resemblance between the Blessed Virgin and Divine Wisdom; hence the passages of the Old Testament relating to Hypostatic Wisdom are referred to her by the Church.[15] Again, the experiences of Ecclesiasticus were similar to those of Christian martyrs; for this reason his prayer is attributed by the Liturgy to saintly women.[16]

The use of the *accommodated sense* is objectionable if there is no similarity between the situation described in the biblical text and the subject to which it is adapted. In that case the words of the Bible do not enunciate any of the properties of the subject to which they are applied; they merely happen to fit because no account is taken of their real meaning. This mode of accommodating the sense by mere *allusion* is obviously an abuse of Sacred Scripture. It is all the more reprehensible if it is based on a false interpretation of the text.

As an illustration we may take the words of Ps. 38: 4b as translated by the Vulgate: "Et in meditatione mea exardescit ignis" (And in my meditation a fire is enkindled). The Psalmist means that he is overhwelmed with a burning desire to give vent to his feelings concerning his sufferings. To apply these words without restriction to the fervor experienced by devout persons in prayerful meditation is certainly farfetched.

The reasons which the Encyclical alleges for adhering to the genuine sense of the Scriptures deserve to be quoted in full: "Nor does the word of God, which is living and efficient and keener than any twoedged sword, and extending even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and of marrow, and a discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart (Heb. 4: 12), need artificial devices or human accomodation to move and impress souls, for the Sacred Pages, written under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit, abound with an innate significance of their own; endowed with divine power, they are effective in themselves; adorned with supernal beauty, they have their own light and splendor, provided that they are so fully and accurately explained by the interpreter that all the treasures of wisdom and prudence latent in them are brought to light."[17]

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[14] *AAS, ibid.*, pp. 311 f.

[15] Cf. *The Roman Missal,* for the feasts of the Assumption and the Immaculate Conception.

[16] *The Roman Missal,* Common of a Female Martyr, not a Virgin.

The Holy Father concludes this section by exhorting Catholic exegetes to study the Fathers, the Doctors of the Church, and the renowned interpreters of the past. "For thus, ultimately, will be effected a happy and fecund combination of the doctrine and spiritual sweetness of expression of the older authors with the greater erudition and more mature technique of the moderns. This, certainly, will produce new fruits in the field of Divine Letters, a field never sufficiently cultivated and never exhausted."

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[17] *AAS*, *ibid.*, p. 312.

A REVIEW OF PAPAL DOCUMENTS OF 1940

On October 16, 1940, our Holy Father granted an indult through the Sacred Congregation of Rites permitting that in the United States Requiem Masses *praesente cadavere* may be said on solemn feasts of double rite of the first class which are not of obligation, excepting the last three days of Holy Week and the Feasts of Epiphany and Corpus Christi.[1] A recent need for reference to this indult recalled the difficulties that armed hostilities have placed in the way of access to it and to other papal documents issued since the beginning of the war. The value of a compendious review of them thus became apparent. And the publication of such a review seemed to be a service more or less imperative and one that would be welcomed by priests everywhere.

The review will be presented in four installments, covering respectively the documents issued during the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943. As sources, reliance will be placed upon the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* in the first place, and, as a supplementary aid, on Bouscaren's *The Canon Law Digest*, Volume II.

Bouscaren refers to another indult granted by our Holy Father in 1940 to the hierarchy in the United States, that of May 18, issued through the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments.[2] It permitted for three years the conferring of sacred orders outside the times fixed by law, that is, by indult, on feast days of double rite of the first or second class, though not of obligation, and on some Saturdays at the close of the scholastic year. The time limit of this indult expired in 1943. Bouscaren's latest volume contains documents through 1942 only. It is quite possible that this favor has been extended for another term.

The *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* for 1940 contains as foremost among the historical acts of our Holy Father of that year his letter of January 7, 1940, to the President of the United States, in which he accepted the Hon. Myron Taylor as the representative of the latter at the Holy See.[3] In that volume also are to be found his epistle of April 15, 1940[4] felicitating His Eminence, Dennis Cardinal Dougherty, on his sacerdotal golden jubilee; his epistle to the hierarchy of California on the centenary of the establishment of the hierarchy there;[5] and his epistle to the Very Reverend General of the Society of Jesus on the fourth centenary of the foundation of the Society.[6] The Constitution establishing the Diocese of Gallup, though dated December 16, 1939, appears also in the 1940 volume,[7] as does the sermon of the Holy Father delivered on Christmas Eve of the preceding year.[8] One notes also the *Motu proprio* of November 24, 1940, urging the offering of the Holy Sacrifice and public prayer on December 24 for the pressing needs of the world.[9] Recorded there, too, is the *Motu proprio* of December 1, 1940, permitting Ordinaries to allow, in countries where the "blackout" was obligatory, the celebration of midnight Mass, in churches and oratories, earlier in the evening, at an hour that would permit dispersion before the "blackout" became effective. It was provided there that assistance at this Mass satisfied the obligation of hearing Mass on Christmas and that Holy Communion could be received at that Mass even by those who had received in the morning of that day. A fast of four hours from both food and drink was, however, to be observed. The priest who celebrated this Mass would be permitted to celebrate two Masses on Christmas Day, provided he observed the Eucharistic Fast from midnight.[10]

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[1] Bouscaren, II, 200.

[2] Bouscaren, II, 249.

[3] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 43.

[4] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 485; cf. *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, CII (1940), 516.

The Concordat with Portugal of May 7, 1940 is printed in full[11] and also a set of rules issued by the Supreme Apostolic Signatura, explaining the application of Article XXV of the Concordat, under which the decision in marriage cases of the Supreme Apostolic Signatura, to which by special provision lies appeal from the local ecclesiastical courts' decree, is sent to the competent civil tribunal of appeals for civil registration.[12] In connection with the Concordat, too, the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments issued on September 21, 1940, an instruction on the celebration of marriage in Portugal for the purpose of securing the civil effects according to the civil law under the Concordat.[13]

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[5] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 359.
[6] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 289.
[7] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 176.
[8] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 5.
[9] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 385.
[10] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 529.
[11] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 217.
[12] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 381.
[13] *AAS*, XXXII (1941), 29.

THE NATURAL LAW

Two replies of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office condemned practices which seemingly grew out of the totalitarian concept of the State's power: viz., the direct perpetual or temporary sterilization of a man or a woman (February 24, 1940)[14] and the direct killing of innocent persons by order of police authority (December 2, 1940).[15]

An application of the natural law is found also in an instruction and a reply of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, the latter being a corollary of the former. The instruction was issued on December 8, 1939[16] and permitted in China ceremonies in honor of Confucius as purely civil ceremonies and dispensed from the oath on Chinese rites formerly required of missionaries in China. The reply dealt with the latter question as to the oath on the Malabaric rites, and dispensed from it (April 9, 1940).[17]

THE ORIENTAL RITE

A decree and a reply of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church and a reply of the Pontifical Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the Canons of the Code are found in the 1940 volume of the *Acta*. The first of these documents dealt with the training of the clergy of the Oriental Rite in patriarchal territory, and required at least one year of philosophy and three of theology, a curriculum approved by the Ordinary and an examination of the candidates for subdeaconship and priesthood by a competent board of examiners (January 27, 1940).[18] The reply of the Sacred Congregation of June 11, 1940, provided that dignities granted by prelates to priests of another rite carry no faculties but only the right of carrying the appropriate insignia in the liturgical functions of the rite of the grantor, provided that the consent of the local Ordinary has also been obtained.[19] The reply of the Pontifical Commission was issued on April 29, 1940, and ordained that a woman transferring to an Oriental Rite, under Canon 98, § 4, *in matrimonio ineundo*, is bound by the Latin form of marriage mentioned in Canon 1099, § 1, 3°.[20]

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[14] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 73.

[15] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 554; cf. *The Jurist,* I (1941), 155.

[16] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 24.

[17] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 379.

[18] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 152.

[19] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 303.

[20] *AAS*, XXXII (1940, 212.

LITURGY AND INDULGENCES

A formula for the blessing of hospitals issued by the Sacred Congregation of Rites July 18, 1939, appears in the 1940 volume of the Acta,[21] as well as a decree of the Sacred Congregation of April 3, 1940, extending the Feast of St. John Leonardo to the universal Church, and the text of the Mass and Office of this Feast.[22] A decree of the Sacred Congregation of March 12, 1940, provides that all priests who are authorized to give the Apostolic benediction shall use the formula set forth in the Roman Ritual (tit. VIII, cap. 32).[23] Two forms of devotions have been forbidden in a reply of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office (December 12, 1931): namely, the devotion to the annihilated love of Jesus and the Rosary of the Most Sacred Wounds of Our Lord Jesus Christ.[24] A reply of the Code Commission (January 19, 1940) is authority for the power of the confessor to commute under Canon 935 the visit to a particular church required as a condition for the gaining of the *toties quoties* and the Portiuncula indulgence.[25] A summary of the indulgences attached to membership in the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine was issued December 21, 1939, including the privileged altar when Holy Mass is celebrated for a deceased member, as well as plenary indulgences for members at the hour of death and on the day of admission, as well as on certain feasts, including the principal feast of the Confraternity.[26]

CANONS

Two resolutions of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, a declaration of the Apostolic Datary and a reply of the Code Commission dealt with the office of Canons in this volume of the *Acta*. A resolution of the Sacred Congregation of December 9, 1939, provided that the proper church for the funeral of an honorary Canon is the parish church of his domicile or quasi-domicile, not the cathedral church.[27] The second resolution, dated April 19, 1940, determined that a capitular who enters religion does not retain his right to the income of his benefice prior to its vacancy as provided in Canon 584.[28] The declaration of the Apostolic Datary, issued April 8, 1940, abrogated the requirement of a degree in Holy Scripture for the incumbent of the office of canon theologian.[29] And the reply of the Code Commission, dated January 19, 1940, provided that service in a parish other than the capitular parish does not excuse from choir duty under Canon 420, § 1, 4°.[30]

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[21] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 197.
[22] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 311.
[23] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 200.
[24] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 24.
[25] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 62.
[26] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 58.
[27] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 75.
[28] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 374; cf. *The Jurist*, I (1941), 74 ff.

THE SACRAMENTS

A reply of the Sacred Penitentiary of December 10, 1940, clarified the provision for general absolution of soldiers as contained in the Index of Faculties of Major Chaplains reported in the preceding volume of the *Acta*.[31] The reply stated that "when fighting is imminent or actually begun" general absolution is permitted (from sins and censures), but that priests who absolve in this manner shall notify the penitents that absolution so received will be of no benefit unless they were properly disposed, and that they remain obliged to make a full confession in due time.[32]

A reply of the Code Commission of April 29, 1940[33] contained an authentic declaratory interpretation of Canon 1070 compared with Canon 1099, § 2. Some canonists had held that those persons described as *ab acatholicis nati* in Canon 1099, § 2, and as exempt from the Catholic form of marriage, were also exempt from the impediment of disparity of cult. This reply asserts that they are bound by the impediment.[33]

PROCEDURE

By a reply of April 29, 1940, the Code Commission declared that under Canon 1572, § 2, that is, in a case involving the bishop, the latter may not only issue summons but also be summoned.[34]

In its decree of July 10, 1940,[35] the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments issued rules governing the regional tribunals in Italy provided for in the *Motu proprio*, *Qua cura* of December 8, 1938.[36]

In a reply of January 15, 1940, the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office stated that apostates are in the same plight as non-

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[29] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 163.

[30] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 62.

[31] *AAS*, XXXI (1939), 710; Bouscaren, II, 141.

[32] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 571.

[33] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 212.

[34] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 212.

[35] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 304.

[36] *AAS*, XXX (1938), 410.

Catholics under the decree of the Holy Office of January 18, 1928, forbidding the latter to act as plaintiffs in marriage cases.[37]

The Code Commission was interested in defining the province of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments in the adjudication of matrimonial cases and issued a public reply dealing with it on July 8, 1940,[38] following a private reply of a year previous.[39] The latter had determined that the Sacred Congregation cannot intervene in a case after the Promoter of Justice has acted to attack the marriage, even on the ground that there is no proof of urgency to remove scandal. The reply of 1940 determined that the Sacred Congregation can not call the adjudication of a matrimonial case to its own board, or suspend the progress of the case or the execution of the sentence, or even intervene in steps leading to the attacking of the marriage, except as to recourse against the judgment of the Ordinary.

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[37] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 52.

[38] *AAS*, XXXII (1940), 317; cf. *The Jurist*, I (1941), 76 ff.; Bouscaren, II, 106.

[39] Bouscaren, II, 547.

SCHOLASTIC DEFINITIONS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

PART I

The scholastic definitions of the Catholic Church have a unique and highly important function. They are formulae designed to describe the true Church of Jesus Christ as a society distinct from every other religious organization on the face of the earth. Some of the best and most effective theologians have worked towards the elaboration of these definitions. They are so constructed that every element within them bears traces of great controversies about the nature and the characteristics of God's Church.

SOME DEFINITIONS IN THE WORKS OF EARLY SCHOLASTICS

The great Dominican controversialist, Moneta of Cremona (+1235), defined the *ecclesia sanctorum* as the "congregation of the faithful." He added immediately that "this is the Church which is called the Roman Church, whatever its rivals may imagine to the contrary."[1] For Moneta, as well as for a great many of his later co-workers in the field of ecclesiology, the Church of the saints was the organization mentioned in Psalm 149: *Cantate Domino canticum novum, laus eius in Ecclesia Sanctorum.* It was distinguished from and opposed to another assembly, that mentioned in the twenty-fifth Psalm: *Odivi ecclesiam malignantium.*

Moneta offers an interesting and highly competent proof to justify the use of the expression *congregatio fidelium* as a definition of the *ecclesia sancta.*

> Faith is the root of the Holy Church, hence it is said in Rom. 1:17 "The just man liveth by faith," as the tree from the root. It [faith] is the foundation of the spiritual edifice, and hence it is said in Heb. 11:1 "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For this reason it is said in I Cor. 3:11 "For other foundation no man can

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[1] *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque* (Rome, 1743), Lib. V, cap. 1, p. 390. (The translations throughout this paper are our own.)

> lay, but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus," that is, His faith, by reason of which Christ dwells in the hearts of the faithful, as it is said in Eph. 3:11.[2]

Moneta presents as the common teaching of the theologians of his own time a twofold use of this basic definition of the Church.

> It is the teaching of Catholic men that we can consider the Church in two ways. For the Church is called the congregation of the faithful in one manner in such a way that the faithful are designated in terms of faith, without any qualifications whatsoever. But this [faith] was identical as it existed in the Saints of old, who lived before the coming of Christ into the world, and in us who have believed in Him after His advent. . . . But the Church is said to be the congregation of the faithful still in another way, namely in such a way that the faithful are so designated not in function of faith as such, but by reason of faith in Christ, already born of the Virgin, already suffered, etc.[3]

St. Thomas Aquinas (+1274), like Moneta, used the conventional definition. "The Holy Church is the congregation of the faithful, and every Christian is, as it were, a member of this same Church."[4] However, the Angelic Doctor stressed a distinction different from that which had been indicated by his Dominican predecessor. "The Church, according to the *status viae*, is the congregation of the faithful. According to the *status patriae*, however, it is the congregation of those who possess the beatific vision (*congregatio comprehendentium*)."[5]

The great Augustinian Archbishop of Naples, James Cappocci, better known as James of Viterbo (+1308), was primarily concerned with the form of government within the Catholic Church. "The Church is most rightly and most truly and most properly called a kingdom, for the Church is a kind of community, since it is the congregation, or the adunation, or the convocation of many faithful."[6] Some theologians had refused to use the term, *congregatio*, in their definition of the Church, on the grounds that this word was more properly the equivalent of *synagoga*, while the *ecclesia*, on the other hand, was the

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 389.

[3] *Op. cit.*, Lib. V, cap. 2, pp. 408–409.

[4] *De Symbolo Apostolorum*, in the Opuscula Omnia, ed. Mandonnet, Vol. IV, p. 378.

[5] *Sum. Theol.* III, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2 mm.

[6] *Le plus ancien traité de l'Eglise*, Jacques de Viterbe, *De Regimine* Christiano (1301–1302), Etude des sources et édition critique par H-X Arquillière (Paris: Beauchesne, 1926), Pars I, cap. 1, p. 89.

Greek equivalent of *convocatio*. James of Viterbo, in using these two words indifferently in his formula, showed himself not interested in this matter, but rather concerned with indicating the juridical form inherent in the ecclesiastical community. Another fourteenth century theologian, the Franciscan, Alvaro Pelayo (+1349), contented himself with the formula "congregation of the faithful" as a definition of the Catholic Church.[7]

FIFTEENTH CENTURY DEFINITIONS

During the fifteenth century however, by reason of the objections raised by the followers of Wycliffe, there was need of a somewhat more explicit formula. The brilliant Carmelite theologian, Thomas Netter of Walden (+1430), was instrumental in inaugurating the required development.

The basic article in the ecclesiology of those men Netter was called upon to refute was that which the Council of Constance condemned as the first proposition of John Hus: "There is only one holy universal Church, which is the assemblage (*universitas*) of the predestined."[8] To the people threatened by this error, Netter proposed the following formula, indicating that he is speaking of a visible society. "According to this [its visibility], we say that the Church militant is the congregation of all of those who are called, joined together in Catholic society."[9]

According to Netter, Wycliffe had spoken of the Church as the *universitas electorum*.[10] With a manifest reference to the two places in St. Matthew's Gospel where the *electi* are contrasted with the *vocati*,[11] the great Carmelite theologian wished to stress the fact that membership in the Church here in this world was by no means restricted to those who would obtain the grace of final perseverance. All men are called to eternal life, and thus any living man is eligible for membership in the true Church of Jesus Christ.

There were two very important sources for most of these early definitions of the Catholic Church. One was the terminology of the Fourth Lateran Council: "*Una vero est fidelium universalis Ecclesia.*"[12]

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[7] *De Planctu Ecclesiae* (Venice, 1560), cap. 37, p. 8v.

[8] *DB*, 627.

[9] *Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Ecclesiae Catholicae* (Venice, 1621), Lib. II, art. 2, cap. 9, Vol. I, p. 160.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[11] 20:16 and 22:14.

[12] *DB*, 430.

The other was a phrase in the *Decretum* of Gratian, a phrase which, incidentally, was never intended as a definition of the universal Church. A ruling attributed to Pope St. Nicholas I (+867) spoke of a local Church as "catholicorum collectio,"[13] and later writers employed this formula as a basic description of the Catholic Church. Netter was one of the first important theologians to make use of it.

In his anxiety to show that the membership of the Catholic Church included some men who were not predestined to eternal life, Netter employed an unusual terminology. He asserted that "there are two Churches of Christ, that is, the great net, and within that the glorious Church of the predestined, as a wheel in the midst of a wheel."[14] The *great net* was, of course, the visible Catholic Church, indicated under a figure which our Lord Himself had used to designate the Kingdom of Heaven.[15] The image of the wheel in the midst of a wheel was manifestly taken from the book of Ezechiel the Prophet.[16]

The brilliant Bishop of Avila in Spain, Alphonsus Tostatus (+1455) enumerated five meanings which can be attached to the term *ecclesia.* The most important of these meanings is that expressed in his definition of the universal Church, "the entire multitude of all the men believing in Christ."[17]

By far the most important and the most voluminous writer among the fifteenth century ecclesiologists was Cardinal John de Turrecremata (+1468). The great Dominican devoted considerable attention to the definition of the Church. Where Tostatus had mentioned five uses of the term *ecclesia*, Turrecremata spoke of sixteen. It is interesting to note that the second among the meanings which Turrecremata attaches to the word, *ecclesia*, is that of "the entirety of all the faithful, both those in the *status viae* and the men and angels who enjoy the beatific vision." According to the *Summa de Ecclesia* the words of St. Paul in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians apply to the Church, understood in this way. When it is said said God "hath made him [Christ] head over all the Church," the organization mentioned contains the blessed in heaven as well as the faithful on earth.

Turrecremata claims that in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the

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[13] *Decretum Gratiani,* c. 8, D. I, "de cons."

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

[15] *Mt.* 13:47.

[16] *Ez.* 1:16.

[17] *In Matthaeum, Liber V,* In the *Opera Omnia* (Cologne, 1613), Vol. XI, pp. 93–94.

Ephesians, where St. Paul speaks of the Church as having been redeemed by Christ, "Christ is the head of the Church: He is the saviour of his body," reference is made to the assemblage of men, as distinct from angels. However, the most important of the meanings which Turrecremata attaches to the word, *ecclesia*, is that according to which it signifies the assemblage of the faithful who live in the *status viae*. This society he identifies as the *catholicorum sive fidelium collectio*. He attributes this formula to Gratian's *Decretum*. Turrecremata then procedes to expound his own definition of the Church, relying on the authority of the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Scriptures. According to the great Cardinal, the Church is "the company (*universitas*) of the faithful, gathered together for the worship of the true God, in the profession of one faith." The formula, "The Church is the convocation of many for the worship of the one God," found in the *Glossa* on I Tim. 3, is cited in support of Turrecremata's definition.[18]

The most remarkable feature of Turrecremata's formula is his use of the two expressions, the faithful, and the profession of faith. A hundred years after the book was written, ecclesiologists were debating the merits of these two expressions. Some, like St. Peter Canisius and St. Robert Bellarmine, preferred to define the Church in function of the profession of faith. Others, like Francis Suarez and Francis Sylvius, chose to describe the Church as the society of those who actually possess the faith. Turrecremata shows the start of the trend away from this latter type of definition.

Later, when he comes to consider the time when the true Church of Jesus Christ originated, Turrecremata makes an interesting distinction. The Church in the broadest sense, (although the Cardinal did not use this terminology), "is the multitude or community composed of angels, the saints and men, or the society of the angels and sanctified human beings ordered under one ruler, God." Then there is the Church composed of faithful human beings in the *status viae*. Finally there is the Church according to the status of the New Testament. Turrecremata makes no attempt to offer a special definition for the Church as found in this particular status. However, he makes it clear that the Church as the congregation of all the faithful on this earth, which is the society which possesses the sacraments, actually began to exist in the time of Abel.[19] This notion of the origin of the Church, which was common among the earlier scholastic ecclesiologists, seems to have stemmed from our Lord's statement that upon His unbelieving compatriots there might come "all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth from the blood of Abel the just, even unto the blood of Zacharias . . . "[20] Until well into the eighteenth century, scholastic theologians were wont to discuss the question as to whether the Church of Christ dated from Adam or from Abel. Turrecremata offered six reasons to prove that the formula, *congregatio fidelium*, was the most acceptable definition of the Catholic Church.[21]

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[18] *Summa de Ecclesia* (Venice, 1560), Lib. I, cap. 1, p. 2^v.

[19] Cf. *op. cit.*, Lib. I, cap. 25, pp. 28^r–29^r.

Turrecremata also took another important step towards the perfection of the definition of the Catholic Church. He was among the first to consider the *congregatio fidelium* from the point of view of its various causes. Turrecremata distinguished two efficient causes of the Church. The principal efficient cause is our Lord Himself, "for He is the planter and the founder of the Church." He teaches that "the sacraments themselves constitute the instrumental cause of the Church." These sacraments "having power from the passion of Christ, as instruments of the divine goodness, dispose and work towards the edification and the formation of the body of the Church." The faithful themselves make up the material cause of the Church. There is a twofold final cause. The immediate final cause is the sanctification of the Church as a body. The other, which is to be attained only in the next world, is the attainment of eternal blessedness. The formal cause of the Church is the unity of the mystical body with Christ.[22]

EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY THEOLOGIANS

The famous Louvain theologian, John Driedo (+1535), contributed a great deal to the development of the definition of the Church. Like most of his Louvain contemporaries in the field of ecclesiology, Driedo seems to have made little use of previous scholastic writings on the subject. His main source was the literature which St. Augustine produced against the Donatist heresy. Like most of the theologians of his epoch, Driedo offered a general definition of the term *ecclesia*, asserting that it implied a going or coming together in one body, and that a church was a multitude of men agreeing on some one point, or gathering themselves together into some one society. According to

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[20] *Mt.* 23:35; cf. also *Lk.* 11:51.

[21] *Op. cit.*, cap. 3, pp. 4^r–5^v.

[22] *Op. cit.*, cap. 1, pp. 2^v–3^r.

Driedo, there are two Churches, the one the Church of Satan, or the Church of the malign and the impious; the other the Church of Christ. He defines the Church of Christ or the Holy Church as "the multitude which rejoices in holy unity, a unity understood, not as being physically united in some country or province, or in any bodily place, but according to the union of one sign (*signaculum*) of faith, of one Spirit, which in every place gives life to people, whether they recognize each other or not."[23]

There are three points of great importance in Driedo's formula. First, and most important, there is the fact that he lays the way open for the newer type of definition of the Church, the kind which was to become standard in Catholic theology through the efforts of St. Peter Canisius and St. Robert Bellarmine. Driedo speaks of the Church as being united, not in faith alone, but in one sign or seal of faith. This sign was obviously a certain profession of the Christian virtue. Again, he insisted that there was a certain union formed through the activity of the Holy Ghost within the Church.

The third distinguishing feature in the formula of Driedo is his deliberate rejection of visibility as a component of the definition of the Holy Church. Like all of the men who were privileged to fight against the errors of the Reformers, Driedo insisted upon the visibility of the Catholic Church as it exists here and now. However, like Turrecremata, and like the other great theologians who had preceded him in the field of ecclesiology, Driedo looked upon the Catholic Church primarily as an organization which had begun to exist in the days of our first parents. He was cognizant of the fact that those who had been united in their faith in Christ prior to His advent in this world did not form a distinct and visible society. Even the synagogue of the Jews in pre-Christian days was not *the* society of the faithful in the sense in which the Catholic Church is and has been since our Lord brought it into being. Thus, in defining the Church, understood in this way, Driedo logically omitted the notion of visibility from his formula.

Albert Pighius (+1543), another Louvain-trained theologian and controversialist, was also influenced by the trend to supplement the basic formulae which had satisfied the earlier ecclesiologists. According to Pighius, "We understand the Church to be the gathering (*coetus*) of Christ's faithful: not a congregation of the saints alone, hidden in the Spirit, which we could neither recognize nor know how to seek; but [the congregation] of all Christ's faithful, whether they be good or bad, who have given their names to Christ and are enrolled in His warfare through His sacrament."[24] This theologian too favors the *profession* of faith, rather than its possession, as an element in the definition of the Catholic Church. He stresses the idea of the Church *militant* in his formula.

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[23] *De Ecclesiasticis Scripturis et Dogmatibus* (Louvain, 1530), Lib. IV, cap. 2, pars 1, p. 503.

While Driedo and Pighius strove to augment the primitive formula, *congregatio fidelium*, the brilliant German controversialist John Eck (+1543) preferred to use some of the names of the Church in lieu of the more usual definitions. "The Church is the Body of Christ, the Spouse of Christ, the Kingdom of Heaven."[25]

As a faithful follower of St. Augustine in matters of ecclesiology, Driedo's great fellow-worker at Louvain, the elder James Latomus (+1544), stresses the distinction between the nominal definitions of *ecclesia* and *synagoga*. Latomus centered his definition of the Church around the idea of calling or vocation.

According to Latomus, "the first and the greatest convocation, to which all other convocations are referred, is the convocation to eternal beatitude. This will be complete at the end of this world, on the day of the last judgement. For then all of the elect will be present, and the Church will be filled with angels and men." The great Louvain theologian teaches that the word *ecclesia* means this ultimate convocation where St. Paul says that Christ "is the head of the body, the Church," and where he teaches that God has made Christ "head over all the Church."[26]

The second meaning of the term *ecclesia* is dependent upon the fact of sin. Christ is the head of the assembly of men in a way in which He is not the head of the angels, since He is the Saviour of the human race. Latomus explains this second *convocatio*.

> And since the entire human race had perished in Adam, the divine grace, through the death of Christ, called out and called together those it willed. This convocation has been effected every hour of the day of the present age. For, since the beginning, there was no lack of those who called and those who were called. However, at the outset these were few, until the time of the people of the Jews, whom God chose especially for Himself, and to whom,

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[24] *Controversiarum Quibus Nunc Exagitatur Christi Fides et Religio Diligens et Luculenta Explicatio* (Florence, 1541), Pars I, Controversia III, p. 114^r.

[25] *Enchiridion Locorum Communium* (Venice, 1533), p. 1^r.

[26] *De Ecclesia et Humanae Legis Obligatione*, in the *Opera* (Louvain, 1550), cap. 1, p. 93^v. The Scripture reverences are to *Col.* 1:18 and *Eph.* 1:22.

> through Moses, He gave the law or a teacher, to lead this carnal and puerile people little by little to Christ, the Master. But when Christ had come, had taught, suffered, risen again, and ascended, He sent the Holy Ghost upon His apostles, who were to call to the heavenly kingdom, opened by the death of Christ, not any one race, but the entire world; then the name of the Church appeared more clearly, when the truth, which had formerly been veiled in the law and the prophets, was made manifest. This general convocation is called the Catholic Church.[27]

Latomus was among the first to propose a definition of the Church which was meant to apply directly to the society instituted by our Lord during the course of His public ministry. However, this contribution was in some way counter-balanced by Latomus' use of a distinction somewhat similar to that used by Thomas Netter of Walden.

> The Church in the Holy Scriptures and in the Catholic commentators is taken in one way for the assembly of the good, and of those in whom the Holy Ghost dwells, of those who are called the body of Christ. . . . It is taken in another way for the assembly (*coetus*) of the baptized, including both the good and the evil, whom the unity of the body, and Catholic peace, and the communion of visible sacraments in some way bring together. Augustine calls this the *ecclesia permixta*.

Latomus hastens to assure his readers that this twofold definition applies to only one Church.

> Since the *ecclesia permixta* contains the assemblage of the good and, moreover, embraces evil men within its unity, it retains the name and the reality of the Church. The reality and the name being the same, the properties and the accidents, both proper and common, will also be the same. So when any goodness, power, grace, gift, duty or ministry, or anything by whatsoever name it may be called, be considered as given, done or promised to the Church by God the Father, by Jesus Christ, or by the Holy Ghost, or by the Holy Trinity, Whose works with reference to creatures are undivided, there will be no room for distinction between a Church which is the body of Christ in such a way as to contain within itself nothing which is not in act a part of Him, and a member living by His Spirit, and the *ecclesia permixta*, which contains within its membership both good and bad Catholics. On the contrary we should proceed everywhere without distinction.[28]

Latomus then believed that the name *corpus Christi mysticum* applied *primarily* to the members of the Catholic Church who live in the state of habitual grace. But, according to his teaching, however elaborately that teaching was expressed, it applied also ***really*** and ***accurately*** to the existent and visible Catholic Church.

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[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Op. cit.*, cap. 2–3, pp. 93^{v}–94^{r}.

The famous Franciscan John Wild (+1545) taught one general definition of the Church, and two distinct formulae to describe the Church militant and the Church triumphant. According to the general definition, the Church is "the congregation of the children of God, conciliated in Jesus Christ through the Holy Ghost, using one word [of God] and the same sacraments in peace, and possessing one faith, hope, and charity and the other gifts of the Spirit." The Church militant "struggles, fights, and is in pilgrimage yet in the world, and has still mingled in itself the good and the bad, the wheat and the chaff, the good seed and the cockle." The Church triumphant, on the other hand, "is the assembly of the blessed spirits reigning with Christ. It has triumphed over the world and the devil, and rules securely with Christ forever." Wild makes no mention of the Church suffering.[29]

The Spanish Bishop and controversialist, Martin Perez of Ayala (+1548), considered the Church as "the congregation of the faithful, believing in Christ and remaining in the unity of faith." This perseverance in the faith meant that the Catholics, unlike their adversaries, "agreed in one faith under Christ, and in one baptism."[30]

Another who, like Latomus and Perez, brought the notion of baptism into the definition of the Catholic Church, was the great Bishop of Vienna, Frederick Nausea (+1552). According to his teaching the Church is "the entire congregation of the faithful and of those reborn in Christ, which [congregation] is the mystical body of Christ, and Christ is its head."[31]

The distinguished Spanish Franciscan, Alphonsus a Castro (+1558), one of the most prominent figures in counter-Reformation theology, defined the Church militant as "the congregation of all the faithful, which is one body, the head of which is Christ, while all of us are members, one of another."[32]

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[29] *Examen Ordinandorum.* (This *opusculum* is printed as an apendix to the copy of Nausea's *Catholicus Catechismus* in the Catholic University Library.)

[30] *De Divinis, Apostolicis, atque Ecclesiasticis Traditionibus, deque Authoritate ac Vi Earum Sacrosancta* (Paris, 1562), pp. 63^r–63^v.

[31] *Catholicus Catechismus,* Lib. II, art. 9. (This work was first published in Cologne in 1543. Unfortunately, the only edition available for consultation here at the University carries no indication of the time and place of its publication.)

[32] *Adversus Omnes Haereses Libri Quatuordecim,* in the *Opera* (Paris, 1571), Lib. I, cap. 6, col. 30.

The German Dominican Bishop, Michael Vehe (+1559) used the expression *corpus Christi mysticum* as his fundamental designation for the Catholic Church. He set out to overthrow the heretical definition of the Church as "the congregation of the saints, in which the Gospel is taught properly and the sacraments administered properly." Vehe offered as his own definition the statement that the Church is "the congregation which contains good and bad men, both predestined and reprobate, engrafted into Christ through faith."[33]

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[33] *Assertio Sacrorum Quorundam Axiomatum* (Leipzig, 1535), Tractatus I, cap. 1. (The pages of this edition are not numbered.)

Answers to Questions

ALTAR BREADS FOR THE MINISTER

Question: Would a priest ever be allowed to give a Protestant minister altar breads for the celebration of the Protestant communion service?

Answer: The priest who would provide a Protestant minister with altar breads to be used by the latter at his religious service would thereby perform an act of material co-operation toward a false and unauthorized form of cult. Now, according to theological principles, a person may co-operate materially toward another's bad action provided that his own act is lawful, that he merely permits (and does not positively will) the bad action, and that his act directly produces some good effect sufficiently beneficial to justify his allowing the bad action to take place. The greater and the nearer to the sinful action is one's co-operation, the greater must be the reason to justify it. Now, the co-operation toward an objectively sinful religious service would be so proximate on the part of a priest who would furnish the Protestant minister with altar breads specially prepared for communion, that it is difficult to see how there could be a sufficiently grave reason to justify it. Certainly, the priest could not find an adequate reason in the fact that he wishes to retain the minister's friendship, or that he fears he will be regarded as a bigot if he refuses the request. In the event that the minister erroneously regards himself as a priest, possessing the power of validly consecrating the Holy Eucharist, the co-operation of the priest would be still more unjustifiable, inasmuch as it would promote, not simply a false religious rite, but even idolatry.

THE BROKEN WINDOW

Question: A boy taking part with some companions in a ball game on a vacant lot, hits the ball through a store window, worth about $50. Who has the obligation of restitution?

Answer: If the boy and his companions are responsible agents—that is, if they have attained the use of reason—the obligation of restitution, objectively considered, would seem to rest on them all in equal shares. For, the presumption is that the lot is so situated that they should have realized that a ball-game played there constitutes a danger to the property of others; and since they participate in the game as a moral whole, the burden of restitution rests on all equally. Morally, the boy who actually broke the window is bound to no greater amount of restitution than each of his companions. Furthermore, the obligation rests on them *in solidum*, so that if some of them are unwilling or unable to make restitution, the others must make up the deficit. However, if some or even all of the boys are *subjectively* guiltless, because in their immaturity they did not foresee the possibility of the damage that might be caused by a ball-game on this particular lot, then there is no obligation on them, as far as the moral law is concerned, of making any restitution.

But, in the event that the owner of the window, finding out the participants in the game, secures a court order obliging them to pay the costs, the obligation then binds them in conscience, even though their carelessness was subjectively inculpable. In fact, the owner might even establish lack of due supervision on the part of the parents of the boys and obtain a judicial sentence that the parents must pay the costs. In such a case the parents are obliged to make the restitution. However, until a court order of this kind is given, the parents are not obliged in strict justice to make up for the damage, as long as they did not positively co-operate toward the imprudent activities of their sons.

UNEQUAL FEES

Question: May a physician charge his wealthy patients a larger fee than he charges those of moderate means?

Answer: The solution of this problem would be simpler if it were worded thus: "May a physician charge his poorer patients less than he charges the wealthy?" The reply would be: "Yes, provided his fee for the rich is not exorbitant." In the matter of professional fees, as in the sale of commodities, there can be a gradation of just prices. Hence, if a doctor charges a wealthy patient the highest just price, he is not violating justice, even though he may charge another patient much less for the same service. What constitutes a just price, beyond which a doctor could not justly extend his fee even in the case of the wealthiest, is best determined from the custom of capable and honest doctors. It is certainly dishonest for a doctor to charge an extravagant sum, far above the customary fee, just because the patient is able to pay it. On the other hand, it is well to remember that a doctor could fail against the rights of his fellow-doctors at times by charging too little—that is, by reducing his fees below the minimum just amount (in the case of those able to pay the customary fee). In such an event a doctor would be guilty of unfair methods of competition.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

THE NAME OF MOSES

Question: I have read lately in Robinson's *History of Israel* (Oxford: 1938), Vol. I, p. 81 that the derivation of Moses' name in Ex. 2:10 is hardly meant to be taken seriously and that it is in reality an Egyptian name. If this is true, how can it be reconciled with the inerrancy of the Bible?

Answer: The text in question, translated literally from the Hebrew reads: "And she called his name Mosheh and she said, 'for (or, 'verily') I drew him (*mĕshîthî-hu*) from the waters.' " If, therefore, the Pharaoh's daughter spoke Hebrew, she is said to have called the child Mosheh ("he who draws out") because this name was similar in sound to the verb *mashah* which she used to describe the manner in which she saved him (*mĕshîthî-hu*, "I drew him out"). In this supposition, no objection can be reasonably made against the truth of the Bible.

But it seems most unlikely that this Egyptian princess spoke Hebrew in ordinary conversation. Hence, it is almost certain that Mosheh (Moses) represents the Egyptian expression, *mś św*, meaning, "he begot him."[1] In that case, the name of some god was originally expressed or understood, so that Moses was called, "Ah (or Tut or Ra) begot him." Similar names are borne by Egyptian kings, such as Ahmose, Tutmose and Ramses. The Egyptian princess, therefore, may have given the boy a name indicative of divine origin, because she ascribed the fact that she obtained him from the waters to the intervention of some Egyptian god.

In her native language there could not have been a play upon words between the verb she used and the name which she bestowed upon the child (*Mś św*). Josephus attempted to show that such a paronomasia existed even in the supposition that the princess spoke Egyptian.[2] We now realize, however, that his explanation violates the rules of Egyptian grammar.

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[1] Erman und Grapow, *Worterbuch*, *s.v.*

The fact that this play on words is found only in the Hebrew rendering of the princess' words does not militate against the truth of the Bible. The reason is that the inspired writer does not quote the original words nor pretend to give them in an exact and literal translation. He is merely stating their substantial significance. Hence he does not attribute the word-play which he uses to the princess. Moreover, he merely employs a verb similar in sound to the name of Moses, without stating that they are etymologically related. Consequently, the passage cannot be cited as proving the fallibility of the bible.

MICHAEL J. GRUENTHANER, S. J.

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[2] *C.Ap.* 1, 31, §286; *Ant.* II, 9, 6, §228.

Book Reviews

THE RISEN SOLDIER. By Francis J. Spellman. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1944. Pp. 40. $1.00.

The Archbishop of New York compares the American soldier who has lost his life in the service of his country to our Lord, Who shed His blood that men might live forever with God. In the light of this comparison, he speaks to three different groups.

First of all *The Risen Soldier* is a message of consolation to the fathers and mothers, and especially to the mothers, of those boys who have died in the armed forces. Many a Catholic woman will draw spiritual comfort from the realization that another Mother once suffered in giving up her Boy to die, that men might be free.

Secondly, and most emphatically, *The Risen Soldier* points out the terrible responsibilities of those men who have directed the war and who will have the making of the peace. "The young American airmen with whom I was living wanted to believe and did believe that they too were suffering and dying to bring salvation and peace to their fellow men" (p. 2). "I think of my airman who has flown into untellable light, and of untellable millions of his dead soldier-brothers, who have died for liberty and, dying, hoped they died for 'something good' " (p. 30).

The Archbishop, in this allegory, calls upon "the powerful leaders of the powerful nations that will make the peace" to "remember the Risen Soldier and the other soldiers who have died" (p. 31). He makes it clear that anything other than a just and truly Christian peace would be a crass betrayal of those boys who have been summoned to fight for peace and salvation. His book should influence those who follow Christ to labor and to pray in order that the blood spilled from Bataan and Guadalcanal to Salerno and Normandy may not have been wasted, by reason of an unwillingness on the part of those in high places to bring our Lord to the Peace Table.

Finally (and this is not the least important feature of the book), *The Risen Soldier* has a valuable lesson for those in the armed services. For the gaining of victory and peace, a battle must be won in the heart of man himself. For the winning of this internal and spiritual struggle, our Lord, the great Soldier, offers His followers three weapons, obedience, discipline and love. These gifts of Christ are available to the men of the American armed forces. Through these weapons they will inevitably win the ultimate victory.

JOSEPH CLIFFORD FENTON.

AMEN, AMEN. By S. A. Constantino, Jr. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1944. Pp. viii + 184. $2.00.

Why a book like Ensign Constantino's has not appeared before, we don't know. Surely there must have been, in our Catholic colleges, other young seniors who understood their courses in religion, ethics, and natural theology, and who were filled with enthusiasm for the truths these courses contained. But none of these other seniors, as far as we are aware, has ever done anything much about it.

Ensign Constantino has. While still in college he wrote about these truths in a remarkable little book. He wrote for "the guy in the other half of the duplex, the fella on the corner, the cab driver, the lathe mechanic, the movie producer, the inevitable housewife, the girl reporter, the paratrooper, the social-setter, the mailman, the merchant, the chorus girl, the dishwasher, the big shot, the cement mixer, the Wac, the classroom captives down through the high-school seniors, the watermelon grower, the bank head, the model, and even the tire salesman" (pp. 5–6).

We notice that the author seems not to have intended his book for philosophers and theologians. (Unless, of course, he wished to include them among the fellas on the corner.) Consequently, some philosophers and theologians, probably in a fit of pique at having been neglected, might object that Ensign Constantino has not always given his arguments in strict scientific form, and that some of his solutions to moral and social problems are facile rather than profound. But surely such objections would be missing the point: that this is a book which will attract, impress, and possibly influence for the good, many people on whom a "deep," comprehensive, and scholarly study would be completely lost.

Amen, Amen discusses the existence of God, our obligations towards Him, the moral law, and social relationships, in language that is frank, fresh, and up-to-the-minute, with all the peculiar eloquence of the modern American tongue. The author has a genius for picturesque description and illustration. An efficient cause, for him, is "the real-McCoy cause" (p. 22). Everything that begins to exist has a cause: "DiMaggio causes the effect of a two-bagger by hitting one out to the wall in left center. A woman causes the effect of humor by wearing a new spring hat" (p. 21).

Because Ensign Constantino's book is written with an engaging, casual good humor (he suggests on page 49 that the reader might close the book for a while and take a nap), it does not follow that the author is not serious about the whole thing. He is. A whole-hearted desire to share the truth which he possesses, and which so many of his generation lack, underlies every page he writes.

Amen, Amen was not written for priests, of course. But we have an idea that most of them will enjoy reading it, and will be anxious to recommend it to others, especially to the young people, Catholic and prospective Catholic, of their acquaintance.

E. D. BENARD.

MY FATHER'S WILL. By Francis J. McGarrigle, S.J. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1944. Pp. XII + 323. $2.75.

It was the Pseudo-Areopagite and, long before him, Aristotle, who said that good happens only in one way, evil in many ways. The supernatural good and the perfection thereof are no exception. They too happen only in one way and the one way is the Will of God. The fulfillment of the Will of God is the one great norm of morality and Christian perfection, the one secure and infallible guide to salvation. The new book, *My Father's Will*, by Father McGarrigle, S.J., is a very careful analysis of this supreme rule of perfection. The author calls his study an organic treatment, a philosophy of a "principle which is axial in spiritual life." We may add that it is a learned commentary and a masterful variation on the theme of the *Epistle of St. Ignatius on the virtue of obedience*, which classical document forms the second appendix of the book, the first being *Blind obedience that sees*.

The work is divided in five parts. In the first part, the author explains the meaning of God's Will in our lives: in our mind, our will, and our heart. In the second and third, he speaks of the active and passive union with the Will of God. The fourth part is dedicated to obedience both civil and religious as based on God's Will. The last part treats of the perfection of obedience: union with God's Will. In addition to his insight in the matter, Father McGarrigle offers a symposium of spiritual writers and mystics on the subject of the Will of God.

Twenty-three pages of a comprehensive analytical index make the book very practical for consultation. The author needs no explanation, or justification, for publishing another book on the Will of God after that of the other Jesuit, John P. de Coussade, and those of other later writers. In our estimation, his work is far more objective, complete, and documented than any other book on the same subject.

PASCAL P. PARENTE.

THE MAN FROM ROCCA SICCA. By Reginald M. Coffey, O.P. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1941. Pp. 140. $1.75.

With the impetus given in modern times to scholasticism, great attention has been devoted to the study of St. Thomas. New editions of his works are appearing; historians are producing scholarly lives of this saint; philosophical faculties and academies are scientifically investigating the thought of St. Thomas both in its historical setting and in its application to present-day problems.

However, when a man is a towering genius there is a tendency to focus the spotlight on the genius of the man and overlook the man who was a genius. This is all the more true when the genius is a saint. Again, there is a tendency to concentrate on the sanctity and to overlook the man who was a saint.

The Man from Rocca Sicca, by Father Coffey, is an attempt to focus attention on Thomas the man. The author remarks that the earlier biographies devoted too much attention to the sanctity of Thomas; while modern biographers have been interested in Thomas the philosopher and theologian and in the Thomistic system. Both have made little attempt to materialize the man (p. 68).

Because Thomas the man has been too much neglected, hidden too long in the shadows of the *Summa* (pp. 67–68), Father Coffey now wants to show that Thomas was withal very human. The result is a popular sketch of St. Thomas's life that concentrates on the little human touches that make an appeal to every human. Thus we see Thomas as one who had a burning love for his family, but who fought them vehemently to realize his own ambition to become a Dominican rather than to strive for great ecclesiastical honors. Thomas emerges as one who could be the butt of classroom jokes and of the banter of community life; as one who, when visiting a monastery, could be pressed into service by a fellow monk who did not realize that he was ordering about the greatest teacher and preacher of his day. Again, we see Thomas watching with interest the tradesmen in their work of buying and selling, observing with interest the tricks to which they resorted, and then returning to his monastery to write his work *On Buying and Selling*. Thomas is seen in a very human mood when, in an attack of sickness that took away his appetite, he admitted that he might relish a kind of fish called herring. Even his works that seem like chiseled masterpieces of cold, devastating logic are seen in the light of their historical setting as occasioned by some of the most acrimonious disputes of his day, proving that Thomas was very much a man of his times. *The Man from Rocca Sicca* is made all the more appealing by the style of Father Coffey, a style that is brisk, racy, yet withal reverent; but a style that occasionally shows a somewhat partisan spirit (pp. 88–89).

Father Coffey admits that St. Thomas is not the kind of saint to whom John Jones and Sarah Smith pray. It seems doubtful if Father Coffey's book will bring this about. God raises up all kinds of saints in the Church. St. Thomas is a scholar's saint. But scholars will appreciate him all the more for being so very human. The chapters on Thomas the Saint, Thomas the Man, and Thomas the Teacher provide this class of people with much food for thought.

ALFRED C. RUSH, C.SS.R.

PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION. A Catholic Layman's Approach. By Michael O'Shaughnessy. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1943. Pp. v + 151. $2.00.

In this little work an attempt is made to apply Christian social principles to the social and economic problems of postwar reconstruction. While the author brings to his readers considerable doctrine garnered from the principal social encyclicals of Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII, as well as from the Program of Social Reconstruction of the American Hierarchy, etc., and also manifests acquaintance with many of the economic problems of the Western Hemisphere, one experiences considerable disappointment with the author's attempts at correlating and evaluating current social and legal national programs in the light of Christian social doctrine.

The blanket approval apparently given to the Beveridge "cradle to the grave" state social security program, as sympathetically summarized by the British socialist, Harold J. Laski (pp. 72–73), scarcely accords with the social reconstruction program of Pius XI as outlined in his Encyclicals *Quadragesimo Anno* and *On Atheistic Communism.*

With considerable surprise one also reads that "Brazil has the most advanced national social program administered by government in any country in the hemisphere," and that "Co-operation between the foreign owned oil industry and the government in Venezuela, in a wide field of social betterment, has produced such satisfactory results as to merit the close study by industrialists and statesmen everywhere" (p. 78).

Furthermore in the light of history and present emerging trends, one may well wonder whether "the United Nations," with their varying and even conflicting policies and ideologies, are so "well spiritually prepared to follow through to realize universal social justice" (p. 78). Thoroughgoing acceptance of the Christian social program by all, whether individuals or states, alone will ensure peace and reconstruction in both the national and international spheres.

DONALD A. MACLEAN.

TEACHING CONFRATERNITY CLASSES. By Sister M. Rosalia, M.H.S.H. Chicago, Ill., Loyola University Press, 1944. Pp. x + 257. $1.00.

The Confraternity of Christian Doctrine is to be established in every parish in the world by order of Canon 711: 2 of the Code of Canon Law. This world-wide organization proposes to give systematic religious instruction to children who are unable to receive it in the Catholic school. In our country a large number, approximately fifty-five per cent, we are told, of our Catholic children are without adequate religious education. It is for the teachers of these Catholic children attending public schools that Sister Rosalia has written her book. One feels that this new work will some day be even more popular and useful than its predecessor of a decade or so ago: *Child Psychology and Religion.*

Teaching Confraternity Classes shows the author's long and valuable experience in teaching religion to those children spiritually most neglected—"the step-children of our parishes," as some one put it recently. The subtitle of the book, "The Adaptive Way," is explained as follows: "All teaching must be adapted to the nature and to the needs of the child. . . . Teaching religion to Catholic pupils of public schools is a special field, and whatever is accepted from outside sources must be adapted to it." This reviewer did not find any mention of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine under whose auspices the users of the book will work; and he feels that there is need for inclusion of a working bibliography on the subject. These omissions perhaps will be rectified in the future editions which this book assuredly deserves.

JOSEPH B. COLLINS, S.S.

Book Notes

Rosalie Marie Levy's autobiography, *Thirty Years With Christ* (Published by the author, New York, P.O. Box 158, Station O, 1943. Pp. 246. $2.00), gives us the story, simply told, of a convert to Catholicism from the Jewish faith. Miss Levy is an energetic convert and quite obviously a fearless one. She has recognized the apostolic mission of the Catholic laity, and her life has been spent in attempting to help others find their way into the one true Church.

From the pages of *Thirty Years With Christ* there glows the whole-hearted, fervent faith of one to whom the beauty and the wonder of Catholicism have never become commonplace. This is an ideal volume to place in the hands of a prospective convert from Israel; it might also be a good book to give to Catholics who are a bit inclined to be self-conscious and apologetic in the manifestation of their religion.

An attractive reprint of the thirteenth edition of Arregui's *Summarium Theologiae Moralis* has been issued this year by The Newman Bookshop of Westminster, Md. In this compact, comprehensive volume of 689 pages priests will find a clear and convenient summary, based upon the Code of Canon Law and the teachings of St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, and Cardinal De Lugo, of Catholic moral theology. An excellent index adds to the value of the work as an instrument useful for quick reference by the celebrated "busy pastor" and the not-so-celebrated but none the less busy curate. The book is priced at $2.50.

The Newman Bookshop is continuing its good work of bringing out well-bound and well set-up reprints of works which have become Catholic classics. Cardinal Manning's *The Eternal Priesthood*, which is one of those books which every priest is convinced that he has read, but which remains literally a closed book to many, is one of the latest. It is priced at $1.50. The *Letters to Persons in Religion* of St. Francis de Sales (Translated into English by the Rev. Henry Benedict Mackay, O.S.B.), is another Newman Bookshop reprint which deserves a wide circulation. Most of the letters were addressed, naturally, to the Saint's own Sisters of the Visitation,—many of them to St. Jane Francis de Chantal. They make admirable spiritual reading for religious women, and priests entrusted with the spiritual care of Sisters will find not a few helpful suggestions in the sound spirituality, practical good sense and exquisite gentleness and tact of St. Francis de Sales. Newman Bookshop has also published a new reprint of Father Faber's *All For Jesus*, which has enjoyed a steady popularity since its first printing in 1853. *Letters to Persons in Religion* is priced at $2.75, and Father Faber's book at $2.50.